Detection rules › Elastic
Potential Injection via Module Stomping
Identifies the load of a library with a unusual memory private bytes allocation. This may be the result of a code injection using module stomping or DLL hollowing via overwriting the content of legit DLL with malicious code.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the load of a library with a unusual memory private bytes allocation. This may be the result of a code
injection using module stomping or DLL hollowing via overwriting the content of legit DLL with malicious code.
"""
id = "ace1b159-be74-413c-bbe0-b5383fb9770b"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Injection via Module Stomping"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/modulestomping-dll-hollowing-shellcode-injection",
]
version = "1.0.21"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id
[process where event.type:"start" and
not process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "low" and
not process.hash.sha256 : "123c8b533f529fcfda0fd48077c79fd2c71750237741fbd771ece8244550303e" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\rpcnet.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\rpcnet.exe")]
[library where
dll.name in~ ("ws2_32.dll", "wininet.dll", "winhttp.dll") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.allocation_private_bytes >= 100000 and
$entry.symbol_info: ("?:\\windows\\System32\\*.dll", "?:\\windows\\SysWOW64\\*.dll")) and length(process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary) <= 60 and
/* critical for a process, often hooked by other EPP or AV, EPP or AV own DLLs */
not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.allocation_private_bytes >= 100000 and
$entry.symbol_info:
("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\KernelBase.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\KernelBase.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\ntdll.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ScriptControl32_*.dll!*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\rpcrt4.dll!*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\rpcrt4.dll!",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\combase.dll!*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\combase.dll!*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\webio.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\TWAINDSM.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\ws2_32.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\user32.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\cyinjct.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\twpix32.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\IMCRCMN3.DLL*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Windows.Security.Authentication.Web.Core.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\assembly\\NativeImages_*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\spool\\drivers\\*")) and
not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.allocation_private_bytes >= 100000 and
startswith~($entry.symbol_info, process.executable)) and
not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info:
("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.dll*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\hmpalert.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\umppc*.dll*"))]
until [process where event.action == "end"]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.type:"start" and
not process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "low" and
not process.hash.sha256 : "123c8b533f529fcfda0fd48077c79fd2c71750237741fbd771ece8244550303e" and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\rpcnet.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\rpcnet.exe")]
Stage 2: library
[library where
dll.name in~ ("ws2_32.dll", "wininet.dll", "winhttp.dll") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.allocation_private_bytes >= 100000 and
$entry.symbol_info: ("?:\\windows\\System32\\*.dll", "?:\\windows\\SysWOW64\\*.dll")) and length(process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary) <= 60 and
not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.allocation_private_bytes >= 100000 and
$entry.symbol_info:
("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\KernelBase.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\KernelBase.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\ntdll.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\ScriptControl32_*.dll!*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\rpcrt4.dll!*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\rpcrt4.dll!",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\combase.dll!*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\combase.dll!*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\webio.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\TWAINDSM.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\ws2_32.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\user32.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\cyinjct.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\twpix32.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\IMCRCMN3.DLL*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Windows.Security.Authentication.Web.Core.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\assembly\\NativeImages_*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\spool\\drivers\\*")) and
not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.allocation_private_bytes >= 100000 and
startswith~($entry.symbol_info, process.executable)) and
not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info:
("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.dll*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\Sys*\\hmpalert.dll*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\umppc*.dll*"))]
Until: process
until [process where event.action == "end"]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name | eq | low | excludes:process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name field:"process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name" value:"low" |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files (x86)\*, ?:\Program Files\*, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\rpcnet.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\rpcnet.exe | excludes:process.executable |
process.hash.sha256 | eq | 123c8b533f529fcfda0fd48077c79fd2c71750237741fbd771ece8244550303e | excludes:process.hash.sha256 field:"process.hash.sha256" value:"123c8b533f529fcfda0fd48077c79fd2c71750237741fbd771ece8244550303e" |
process.thread.Ext.call_stack | array_any | excludes:process.thread.Ext.call_stack |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.name | in |
| field:"dll.name" kind:in |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"end" |
event.type | wildcard |
| field:"event.type" kind:wildcard value:"start" |