Detection rules › Elastic
Process Started in a Hidden Desktop
Identifies the execution of a process in an hidden desktop within the default interactive window station. This may indicate an attempt to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a process in an hidden desktop within the default interactive window station. This may
indicate an attempt to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users.
"""
id = "b90e3fdf-b525-4e27-914a-920f1afd1b4e"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Process Started in a Hidden Desktop"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003/",
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-security-labs-discovers-lobshot-malware",
]
version = "1.0.5"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and process.Ext.desktop_name like "WinSta0\\*" and
not process.Ext.desktop_name : ("WinSta0\\Winlogon", "WinSta0\\Screen-saver", "WinSta0\\ScreenConnectDesktop", "WinSta0\\InstallerDesktop") and
not (process.parent.executable : "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\SnapComms\\App\\*\\SnapClientHelper.exe" and
process.Ext.desktop_name : ("WinSta0\\DummyDesktopForInstantResume", "WinSta0\\ScreenConnectDesktop", "WinSta0\\Disconnect", "WinSta0\\sbox_alternate_desktop_local_winstation_*"))
'''
min_endpoint_version = "9.1.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1564"
name = "Hide Artifacts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1564.003"
name = "Hidden Window"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "9.1.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and process.Ext.desktop_name like "WinSta0\\*" and
not process.Ext.desktop_name : ("WinSta0\\Winlogon", "WinSta0\\Screen-saver", "WinSta0\\ScreenConnectDesktop", "WinSta0\\InstallerDesktop") and
not (process.parent.executable : "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\SnapComms\\App\\*\\SnapClientHelper.exe" and
process.Ext.desktop_name : ("WinSta0\\DummyDesktopForInstantResume", "WinSta0\\ScreenConnectDesktop", "WinSta0\\Disconnect", "WinSta0\\sbox_alternate_desktop_local_winstation_*"))
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.Ext.desktop_name | wildcard | WinSta0\DummyDesktopForInstantResume, WinSta0\ScreenConnectDesktop, WinSta0\Disconnect, WinSta0\sbox_alternate_desktop_local_winstation_* | excludes:process.Ext.desktop_name |
process.parent.executable | wildcard | C:\Program Files (x86)\SnapComms\App\*\SnapClientHelper.exe | excludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"C:\Program Files (x86)\SnapComms\App\*\SnapClientHelper.exe" |
process.Ext.desktop_name | eq | WinSta0\Winlogon, WinSta0\Screen-saver, WinSta0\ScreenConnectDesktop, WinSta0\InstallerDesktop | excludes:process.Ext.desktop_name |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.Ext.desktop_name | wildcard |
| field:"process.Ext.desktop_name" kind:wildcard value:"WinSta0\*" |