Detection rules › Elastic

Protected Process from Unusual Parent

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies when an unsigned process or a proxy execution utility spawns a protected process. This may indicate an attempt to bypass PPL protection and inject malicious code into a protected process or disable security software.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies when an unsigned process or a proxy execution utility spawns a protected process. This may indicate an
attempt to bypass PPL protection and inject malicious code into a protected process or disable security software.
"""
id = "9dbdcb78-6f0c-48cd-bfb8-46078de392ad"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Protected Process from Unusual Parent"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/08/countering-edrs-with-backing-of-ppl-protection.html"]
version = "1.0.1"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and process.Ext.protection like "PsProtectedSigner*" and
 (
  process.parent.code_signature.exists == false or
  process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or
  process.parent.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "explorer.exe", "powershell.exe", "msbuild.exe")
  )
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1211"
name = "Exploitation for Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211/"

[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and process.Ext.protection like "PsProtectedSigner*" and
 (
  process.parent.code_signature.exists == false or
  process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or
  process.parent.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "explorer.exe", "powershell.exe", "msbuild.exe")
  )

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
process.Ext.protectionwildcard
  • PsProtectedSigner* corpus 2 (elastic 2)
field:"process.Ext.protection" kind:wildcard value:"PsProtectedSigner*"
process.parent.code_signature.existseq
  • false transforms: boolean corpus 25 (elastic 25)
field:"process.parent.code_signature.exists" kind:eq value:"false"
process.parent.code_signature.trustedeq
  • false transforms: boolean corpus 26 (elastic 26)
field:"process.parent.code_signature.trusted" kind:eq value:"false"
process.parent.namewildcard
  • explorer.exe corpus 51 (elastic 50, splunk 1)
  • msbuild.exe corpus 4 (elastic 4)
  • powershell.exe corpus 39 (elastic 36, kusto 2, splunk 1)
  • regsvr32.exe corpus 13 (elastic 13)
  • rundll32.exe corpus 20 (elastic 20)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard