Detection rules › Elastic
Quarantine Attribute Deleted via Untrusted Binary
Identifies a potential Gatekeeper bypass from an unsigned or untrusted binary. In macOS, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a quarantine flag set on the file. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time. An adversary may disable this attribute to evade defenses.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies a potential Gatekeeper bypass from an unsigned or untrusted binary. In macOS, when applications or programs
are downloaded from the internet, there is a quarantine flag set on the file. This attribute is read by Apple's
Gatekeeper defense program at execution time. An adversary may disable this attribute to evade defenses.
"""
id = "6e47b750-72c4-4af9-ad7b-0fc846df64d3"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Quarantine Attribute Deleted via Untrusted Binary"
os_list = ["macos"]
version = "1.0.29"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=1m
[process where event.action == "exec" and
(process.code_signature.trusted == false or process.code_signature.exists == false) and
not process.hash.sha256 == "2d3aa19d6f012c1a4ebc5907a05b06cf0d43a1499107020f59847ea2638c8649" and
not process.executable like "/opt/homebrew/*"] by process.entity_id
[process where event.action == "exec" and
process.args like~ "*xattr" and
process.name like~ ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "xattr", "python*", "osascript") and
(
(process.args like "com.apple.quarantine" and process.args like~ ("-d", "-w", "-?d", "-?w")) or
(process.args == "-c" and not process.args like "github.com/pkg/xattr")
)
] by process.parent.entity_id
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1553"
name = "Subvert Trust Controls"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1553.001"
name = "Gatekeeper Bypass"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.action == "exec" and
(process.code_signature.trusted == false or process.code_signature.exists == false) and
not process.hash.sha256 == "2d3aa19d6f012c1a4ebc5907a05b06cf0d43a1499107020f59847ea2638c8649" and
not process.executable like "/opt/homebrew/*"] by process.entity_id
Stage 2: process
[process where event.action == "exec" and
process.args like~ "*xattr" and
process.name like~ ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "xattr", "python*", "osascript") and
(
(process.args like "com.apple.quarantine" and process.args like~ ("-d", "-w", "-?d", "-?w")) or
(process.args == "-c" and not process.args like "github.com/pkg/xattr")
)
] by process.parent.entity_id
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | starts_with | /opt/homebrew/ | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"/opt/homebrew/" |
process.hash.sha256 | eq | 2d3aa19d6f012c1a4ebc5907a05b06cf0d43a1499107020f59847ea2638c8649 | excludes:process.hash.sha256 field:"process.hash.sha256" value:"2d3aa19d6f012c1a4ebc5907a05b06cf0d43a1499107020f59847ea2638c8649" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec" |
process.args | eq |
| field:"process.args" kind:eq value:"-c" |
process.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.args" kind:wildcard |
process.code_signature.exists | eq |
| field:"process.code_signature.exists" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq |
| field:"process.code_signature.trusted" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |