Detection rules › Elastic
Registry Modification from a Potentially Altered Call Stack
Detects registry modification from a potentially altered call stack in order to conceal the true source of the call.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = "Detects registry modification from a potentially altered call stack in order to conceal the true source of the call."
id = "2296595e-26d5-4834-8aa1-2602d11de45e"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Registry Modification from a Potentially Altered Call Stack"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/doubling-down-etw-callstacks"]
version = "1.0.2"
query = '''
registry where event.action == "modification" and process.executable != null and registry.value == "CachePrefix" and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary :
("ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|wininet.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|wininet.dll|kernel32.dll*",
"ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|wininet.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|wininet.dll|kernelbase.dll*") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info: "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wininet.dll!HttpSendRequest*") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ntdll.dll!LdrGetDllPath*") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\KernelBase.dll!GetProcessTimes*"))
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: registry
registry where event.action == "modification" and process.executable != null and registry.value == "CachePrefix" and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary :
("ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|wininet.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|wininet.dll|kernel32.dll*",
"ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|wininet.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|wininet.dll|kernelbase.dll*") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info: "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wininet.dll!HttpSendRequest*") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ntdll.dll!LdrGetDllPath*") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\KernelBase.dll!GetProcessTimes*"))
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.thread.Ext.call_stack | array_any | excludes:process.thread.Ext.call_stack | |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"modification" |
process.executable | is_not_null | field:"Image" kind:is_not_null | |
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary | wildcard |
| field:"process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary" kind:wildcard |
registry.value | eq |
| field:"registry_value_name" kind:eq value:"CachePrefix" |