Detection rules › Elastic
Self-Deleted Python Script Outbound Network Connection
Detects an outbound network connection by a Python script that was executed and deleted from disk. A recent DPRK initial access campaign that resulted in the theft of $1.5 billion dollars used a Python application that self deletes and continues operating in memory.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth | |
| Command & Control |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects an outbound network connection by a Python script that was executed and deleted from disk. A recent DPRK initial
access campaign that resulted in the theft of $1.5 billion dollars used a Python application that self deletes and
continues operating in memory.
"""
id = "fdaa3c78-6df7-4c87-be78-1acadecc908a"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Self-Deleted Python Script Outbound Network Connection"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = [
"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/slow-pisces-new-custom-malware/",
"https://slowmist.medium.com/cryptocurrency-apt-intelligence-unveiling-lazarus-groups-intrusion-techniques-a1a6efda7d34",
]
version = "1.0.5"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=15s
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name like~ "python*" and process.args_count == 2] as event0
[file where event.action == "deletion" and file.extension in ("py", "pyc") and process.name like~ "python*" and
stringcontains~(event0.process.command_line, file.path)]
[network where event.type == "start" and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
"240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15",
"192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
"192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24",
"100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
"::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.006"
name = "Python"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1070"
name = "Indicator Removal"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1070.004"
name = "File Deletion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1105"
name = "Ingress Tool Transfer"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 15s, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name like~ "python*" and process.args_count == 2] as event0
Stage 2: file
[file where event.action == "deletion" and file.extension in ("py", "pyc") and process.name like~ "python*" and
stringcontains~(event0.process.command_line, file.path)]
Stage 3: network
[network where event.type == "start" and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
"240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15",
"192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
"192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24",
"100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
"::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
destination.ip | cidr_match | 240.0.0.0/4, 233.252.0.0/24, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.19.0.0/16, 192.18.0.0/15, 192.0.0.0/24, 10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.0.2.0/24, 192.31.196.0/24, 192.52.193.0/24, 192.168.0.0/16, 192.88.99.0/24, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.175.48.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, ::1, FE80::/10, FF00::/8 | excludes:destination.ip |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.