Detection rules › Elastic
Self Injection via AppDomain Manager Assembly
Identifies an attempt to load a recently created and unsigned DLL file by a .NET application via an AppDomain Manager manifest followed by suspicious VirtualProtect call to modify the memory content of the loaded DLL. This may indicate an attempt to load a malicious module via DLL search order hijacking.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies an attempt to load a recently created and unsigned DLL file by a .NET application via an AppDomain Manager
manifest followed by suspicious VirtualProtect call to modify the memory content of the loaded DLL. This may indicate an
attempt to load a malicious module via DLL search order hijacking.
"""
id = "50dd274c-651e-46aa-9485-768fa4939b93"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Self Injection via AppDomain Manager Assembly"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/05/05/appdomain-manager-injection-new-techniques-for-red-teams/",
]
version = "1.0.3"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
[library where
not dll.code_signature.status : "trusted" and not endswith~(dll.name, process.name) and
user.id : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
(dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <= 500 or
dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time <= 500 or
(dll.Ext.device.product_id : ("Virtual DVD-ROM", "Virtual Disk","USB *") and not dll.path : "C:\\*")) and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info: "*clr.dll!ParseManifest*") and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary : "ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|clr.dll|mscorlib.ni.dll|clr.dll|mscoreei.dll|mscoree.dll|kernel32.dll|ntdll.dll" and
/* DLL loaded from the process.executable current directory */
endswith~(substring(dll.path, 0, length(dll.path) - (length(dll.name) + 1)), substring(process.executable, 0, length(process.executable) - (length(process.name) + 1))) and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Explorer.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\splwow64.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*") and
not dll.path :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\assembly\\NativeImages\\*",
"?:\\windows\\WinSxS\\*",
"?:\\windows\\system32\\*",
"?:\\windows\\syswow64\\*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")] as event0
[api where process.Ext.api.name : "VirtualProtect" and process.Ext.api.parameters.size >= 10000 and
stringcontains~(process.Ext.api.metadata.target_address_path, event0.dll.path) and
process.Ext.api.parameters.protection : "RWX" and process.Ext.api.parameters.protection_old : "RCX" and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.name : "Unbacked" and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.protection_provenance : "clr.dll"]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1574.001"
name = "DLL"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: library
[library where
not dll.code_signature.status : "trusted" and not endswith~(dll.name, process.name) and
user.id : ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
(dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <= 500 or
dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time <= 500 or
(dll.Ext.device.product_id : ("Virtual DVD-ROM", "Virtual Disk","USB *") and not dll.path : "C:\\*")) and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info: "*clr.dll!ParseManifest*") and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary : "ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|clr.dll|mscorlib.ni.dll|clr.dll|mscoreei.dll|mscoree.dll|kernel32.dll|ntdll.dll" and
endswith~(substring(dll.path, 0, length(dll.path) - (length(dll.name) + 1)), substring(process.executable, 0, length(process.executable) - (length(process.name) + 1))) and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Explorer.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\splwow64.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*") and
not dll.path :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\assembly\\NativeImages\\*",
"?:\\windows\\WinSxS\\*",
"?:\\windows\\system32\\*",
"?:\\windows\\syswow64\\*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*")] as event0
Stage 2: api
[api where process.Ext.api.name : "VirtualProtect" and process.Ext.api.parameters.size >= 10000 and
stringcontains~(process.Ext.api.metadata.target_address_path, event0.dll.path) and
process.Ext.api.parameters.protection : "RWX" and process.Ext.api.parameters.protection_old : "RCX" and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.name : "Unbacked" and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.protection_provenance : "clr.dll"]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.code_signature.status | eq | trusted | excludes:dll.code_signature.status field:"dll.code_signature.status" value:"trusted" |
dll.name | ends_with | process.name | excludes:dll.name field:"dll.name" value:"process.name" |
dll.path | starts_with | ?:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\DriverStore\FileRepository\, ?:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages\, ?:\windows\WinSxS\, ?:\windows\system32\, ?:\windows\syswow64\, ?:\Program Files\, ?:\Program Files (x86)\, ?:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\ | excludes:dll.path |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files\*, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*, ?:\Windows\Explorer.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\*, ?:\Windows\System32\*, ?:\Windows\splwow64.exe, ?:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\* | excludes:process.executable |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.