Detection rules › Elastic
Service Disabled via Registry Modification
Identifies attempts to modify services start settings using processes other than services.exe. Attackers may attempt to modify security and monitoring services to avoid detection or delay response.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Defense Impairment | |
| Impact |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/29"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/03/24"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Identifies attempts to modify services start settings using processes other than services.exe. Attackers may attempt to
modify security and monitoring services to avoid detection or delay response.
"""
from = "now-119m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "endgame-*"]
interval = "60m"
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Service Disabled via Registry Modification"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "75dcb176-a575-4e33-a020-4a52aaa1b593"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Rule Type: BBR",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
registry.path : (
"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start",
"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start"
) and registry.data.strings : ("3", "4") and
not
(
process.name : "services.exe" and user.id : "S-1-5-18"
)
and not registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\MrxSmb10\\Start"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1112"
name = "Modify Registry"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1562"
name = "Impair Defenses"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1562.001"
name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1489"
name = "Service Stop"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0040"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: registry
registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
registry.path : (
"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start",
"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start"
) and registry.data.strings : ("3", "4") and
not
(
process.name : "services.exe" and user.id : "S-1-5-18"
)
and not registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\MrxSmb10\\Start"
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.name | eq | services.exe | excludes:process.name field:"process.name" value:"services.exe" |
user.id | eq | S-1-5-18 | excludes:user.id field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-18" |
registry.path | eq | HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MrxSmb10\Start | excludes:registry.path field:"registry.path" value:"HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MrxSmb10\Start" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"change" |
registry.data.strings | wildcard |
| field:"Details" kind:wildcard |
registry.path | wildcard |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:wildcard |