Detection rules › Elastic
Service Disabled via Registry Modification
Identifies attempts to modify services start settings using processes other than services.exe. Attackers may attempt to modify security and monitoring services to avoid detection or delay response.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1112 Modify Registry |
| Stealth | T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
| Defense Impairment | T1112 Modify Registry |
| Impact | T1489 Service Stop |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 12 | RegistryEvent (Object create and delete) |
| Sysmon | Event ID 13 | RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
| Sysmon | Event ID 14 | RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename) |
Rule body elastic
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/29"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/03/24"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Identifies attempts to modify services start settings using processes other than services.exe. Attackers may attempt to
modify security and monitoring services to avoid detection or delay response.
"""
from = "now-119m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.registry-*", "endgame-*"]
interval = "60m"
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Service Disabled via Registry Modification"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "75dcb176-a575-4e33-a020-4a52aaa1b593"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Rule Type: BBR",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
registry.path : (
"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start",
"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start"
) and registry.data.strings : ("3", "4") and
not
(
process.name : "services.exe" and user.id : "S-1-5-18"
)
and not registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\MrxSmb10\\Start"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1112"
name = "Modify Registry"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1562"
name = "Impair Defenses"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1562.001"
name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1489"
name = "Service Stop"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0040"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: registry
registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
registry.path : (
"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start",
"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\Start"
) and registry.data.strings : ("3", "4") and
not
(
process.name : "services.exe" and user.id : "S-1-5-18"
)
and not registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\MrxSmb10\\Start"
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
process.name | eq | services.exe |
user.id | eq | S-1-5-18 |
registry.path | eq | HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MrxSmb10\Start |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
|
registry.data.strings | wildcard |
|
registry.path | wildcard |
|