Detection rules › Elastic
Shadow Copy Service Disabled via Registry Modification
Identifies attempt to disable the Windows Shadow Copy service via registry modification. Malware may include this type of suspicious service start changes to decrease system recovery chances.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Defense Impairment | |
| Impact |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempt to disable the Windows Shadow Copy service via registry modification. Malware may include this type
of suspicious service start changes to decrease system recovery chances.
"""
id = "b2409cd4-3b23-4b2d-82e4-bbb25594999a"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Shadow Copy Service Disabled via Registry Modification"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.28"
query = '''
registry where
registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\VSS\\Start" and registry.data.strings : "4" and
not process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" and process.executable : "?*" and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Enestech Software (Cyprus) Ltd" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1112"
name = "Modify Registry"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1490"
name = "Inhibit System Recovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0040"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: registry
registry where
registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\VSS\\Start" and registry.data.strings : "4" and
not process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" and process.executable : "?*" and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Enestech Software (Cyprus) Ltd" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | Enestech Software (Cyprus) Ltd | excludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Enestech Software (Cyprus) Ltd" |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
process.executable | eq | ?:\Windows\System32\services.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\services.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"?*" |
registry.data.strings | wildcard |
| field:"Details" kind:wildcard value:"4" |
registry.path | wildcard |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:wildcard value:"HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet*\Services\VSS\Start" |