Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Activity from a Control Panel Applet
Identifies an attempt to load a network library or perform API calls to manipulate memory from an unsigned Control Panel Applet and located in unusual folders.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies an attempt to load a network library or perform API calls to manipulate memory from an unsigned Control Panel
Applet and located in unusual folders.
"""
id = "41859cf7-8a3f-48b1-8130-6bba565592a3"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Activity from a Control Panel Applet"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/doubling-down-etw-callstacks"]
version = "1.0.12"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id
[library where process.executable != null and
(dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <= 900 or dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time <= 900 or dll.path : "\\Device\\Mup\\*") and
(dll.code_signature.exists == false or
dll.code_signature.status : ("errorBadDigest", "errorExpired", "errorRevoked", "errorTimeStamp", "errorUntrustedRoot")) and
not dll.path regex~ """([C-H]:\\windows\\system32\\[a-zA-Z0-9\-\_\.]+\.cpl|[C-H]:\\windows\\syswow64\\[a-zA-Z0-9\-\_\.]+\.cpl)"""] as event0
[any where
(
(((event.category == "api" and not process.Ext.api.name : "IoCreateDevice") or
(event.category : "library" and dll.name : ("ws2_32.dll", "winhttp.dll", "wininet.dll"))) and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, stringcontains~($entry.symbol_info, concat(event0.dll.name, "!CPlApplet")))) or
(event.category : "process" and event.action == "start" and
_arraysearch(process.parent.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, stringcontains~($entry.symbol_info, concat(event0.dll.name, "!CPlApplet")))) or
(event.category == "api" and process.Ext.api.name != "IoCreateDevice" and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, endswith~($entry.protection_provenance, "*.cpl") and stringcontains~($entry.protection_provenance, event0.dll.name)))
)]
until [process where event.action == "end"]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.002"
name = "Control Panel"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: library
[library where process.executable != null and
(dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <= 900 or dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time <= 900 or dll.path : "\\Device\\Mup\\*") and
(dll.code_signature.exists == false or
dll.code_signature.status : ("errorBadDigest", "errorExpired", "errorRevoked", "errorTimeStamp", "errorUntrustedRoot")) and
not dll.path regex~ """([C-H]:\\windows\\system32\\[a-zA-Z0-9\-\_\.]+\.cpl|[C-H]:\\windows\\syswow64\\[a-zA-Z0-9\-\_\.]+\.cpl)"""] as event0
Stage 2: any
[any where
(
(((event.category == "api" and not process.Ext.api.name : "IoCreateDevice") or
(event.category : "library" and dll.name : ("ws2_32.dll", "winhttp.dll", "wininet.dll"))) and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, stringcontains~($entry.symbol_info, concat(event0.dll.name, "!CPlApplet")))) or
(event.category : "process" and event.action == "start" and
_arraysearch(process.parent.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, stringcontains~($entry.symbol_info, concat(event0.dll.name, "!CPlApplet")))) or
(event.category == "api" and process.Ext.api.name != "IoCreateDevice" and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, endswith~($entry.protection_provenance, "*.cpl") and stringcontains~($entry.protection_provenance, event0.dll.name)))
)]
Until: process
until [process where event.action == "end"]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.path | regex_match | ([C-H]:\windows\system32\[a-zA-Z0-9\-\_.]+.cpl|[C-H]:\windows\syswow64\[a-zA-Z0-9\-\_.]+.cpl) | excludes:dll.path field:"dll.path" value:"([C-H]:\windows\system32\[a-zA-Z0-9\-\_.]+.cpl|[C-H]:\windows\syswow64\[a-zA-Z0-9\-\_.]+.cpl)" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time | le |
| field:"dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time" kind:le value:"900" |
dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time | le |
| field:"dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time" kind:le value:"900" |
dll.code_signature.exists | eq |
| field:"dll.code_signature.exists" kind:eq value:"false" |
dll.code_signature.status | wildcard |
| field:"dll.code_signature.status" kind:wildcard |
dll.name | wildcard |
| field:"dll.name" kind:wildcard |
dll.path | wildcard |
| field:"ImageLoaded" kind:wildcard value:"\Device\Mup\*" |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq |
event.category | eq |
| field:"event.category" kind:eq value:"api" |
event.category | wildcard |
| field:"event.category" kind:wildcard |
process.Ext.api.name | ne |
| field:"process.Ext.api.name" kind:ne value:"IoCreateDevice" |
process.executable | is_not_null | field:"Image" kind:is_not_null |