Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious ImageLoad from an ISO Mounted Device
Identifies instances of RunDLL32, Regsvr32 or Odbcconf loading a DLL from a mounted ISO device. Adversaries may deliver a malicious payload via an ISO file and execute it via rundll32.exe, regsvr32 or Odbcconf.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies instances of RunDLL32, Regsvr32 or Odbcconf loading a DLL from a mounted ISO device. Adversaries may deliver
a malicious payload via an ISO file and execute it via rundll32.exe, regsvr32 or Odbcconf.
"""
id = "779b9502-7912-4773-95a1-51cd702a71c8"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious ImageLoad from an ISO Mounted Device"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/Hunting-for-Suspicious-Windows-Libraries-for-Execution-and-Evasion",
]
version = "1.0.29"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "certoc.exe") and
process.parent.name : ("cmd.exe", "explorer.exe", "powershell.exe", "winrar.exe", "7zFM.exe")]
[library where process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "certoc.exe") and
not dll.code_signature.trusted == true and not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
/* loading dll from a mounted device */
(dll.path : "\\Device\\CdRom*" or dll.path regex """[d-zD-Z]:\\[0-9a-zA-Z\.]+""")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.010"
name = "Regsvr32"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.011"
name = "Rundll32"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "certoc.exe") and
process.parent.name : ("cmd.exe", "explorer.exe", "powershell.exe", "winrar.exe", "7zFM.exe")]
Stage 2: library
[library where process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "certoc.exe") and
not dll.code_signature.trusted == true and not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
(dll.path : "\\Device\\CdRom*" or dll.path regex """[d-zD-Z]:\\[0-9a-zA-Z\.]+""")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:dll.code_signature.trusted field:"dll.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
user.id | eq | S-1-5-18, S-1-5-19, S-1-5-20 | excludes:user.id field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-18" field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-19" field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-20" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.path | regex_match |
| field:"ImageLoaded" kind:regex_match value:"[d-zD-Z]:\[0-9a-zA-Z.]+" |
dll.path | wildcard |
| field:"ImageLoaded" kind:wildcard value:"\Device\CdRom*" |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard |