Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Remote Process Thread Access
Identifies attempt to open a remote process thread with THREAD_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION desired access. This may indicate an attempt to hijack the remote thread execution priority.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempt to open a remote process thread with THREAD_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION desired access. This may indicate
an attempt to hijack the remote thread execution priority.
"""
id = "f01594de-1d8e-4995-87e5-dd9e5edb8f88"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Remote Process Thread Access"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://github.com/Octoberfest7/ThreadCPUAssignment_POC/tree/main"]
version = "1.0.3"
query = '''
api where process.Ext.api.behaviors == "cross-process" and
process.Ext.api.name == "OpenThread" and process.Ext.api.parameters.desired_access == "THREAD_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION" and
Target.process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and Target.process.pid != 4 and
not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.code_signature, $entry, $entry.trusted == true) and
not (process.executable :("?:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe", "\\\\?\\Volume{*}\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe") and user.id == "S-1-5-18")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.18.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.18.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: api
api where process.Ext.api.behaviors == "cross-process" and
process.Ext.api.name == "OpenThread" and process.Ext.api.parameters.desired_access == "THREAD_SET_LIMITED_INFORMATION" and
Target.process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and Target.process.pid != 4 and
not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.code_signature, $entry, $entry.trusted == true) and
not (process.executable :("?:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe", "\\\\?\\Volume{*}\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe") and user.id == "S-1-5-18")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe, \\?\Volume{*}\Windows\System32\csrss.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"\\?\Volume{*}\Windows\System32\csrss.exe" |
user.id | eq | S-1-5-18 | excludes:user.id field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-18" |
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.code_signature | array_any | excludes:process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.code_signature |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.