Detection rules › Elastic

Suspicious Windows API Call from Virtual Disk or USB

Time window
2m
Sequence by
process.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies calls to Memory injection related Windows APIs from a process executing from a mounted virtual disk or a removable device. This may indicate an attempt to get initial access via malicious ISO or USB devices.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Stealth

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies calls to Memory injection related Windows APIs from a process executing from a mounted virtual disk or a
removable device. This may indicate an attempt to get initial access via malicious ISO or USB devices.
"""
id = "9d5f965f-6f77-45df-9733-8707e40d1d71"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Windows API Call from Virtual Disk or USB"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/doubling-down-etw-callstacks"]
version = "1.0.19"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=2m
[process where event.action == "start" and
   process.Ext.device.product_id like ("Virtual DVD-ROM", "Virtual Disk", "USB *") and
   not process.executable : "C:\\*" and not process.Ext.device.nt_name: "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*" and 
   not process.Ext.device.vendor_id == "Citrix" and 
   not (process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Veeam Software Group GmbH", "VMware, Inc.") and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
   not (process.executable : "?:\\FirefoxPortable\\App\\Firefox\\firefox.exe" and 
        process.code_signature.subject_name == "Mozilla Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)]
[api where event.category == "intrusion_detection" and
  process.Ext.api.behaviors in ("shellcode", "allocate_shellcode", "execute_shellcode") and
  not process.Ext.api.name in ("SetWindowsHookEx", "NtQueueApcThread") and process.Ext.api.parameters.size > 4096 and
  not process.Ext.api.summary like
                      ("VirtualProtect( user32.dll,*)",
                       "VirtualProtect( clr.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( mscorwks.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( pidgenx.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( sop_check.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( 7-zip.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( umppc*",
                       "VirtualProtect( brc???.tmp,*") and
  not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry,
                   $entry.protection_provenance like ("Kernel", "Kernel|*", "hmpalert.dll", "bdhkm32.dll", "tmmon.dll", "ftapihook32.dll")) and
  not process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary like
        ("ntdll.dll|Unknown|umppc*.dll|ntdll.dll",
         "ntdll.dll|wow64.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ftapihook32.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ntdll.dll")]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 2m, correlated by process.entity_id.

Stage 1: process

[process where event.action == "start" and
   process.Ext.device.product_id like ("Virtual DVD-ROM", "Virtual Disk", "USB *") and
   not process.executable : "C:\\*" and not process.Ext.device.nt_name: "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume*" and 
   not process.Ext.device.vendor_id == "Citrix" and 
   not (process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Veeam Software Group GmbH", "VMware, Inc.") and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
   not (process.executable : "?:\\FirefoxPortable\\App\\Firefox\\firefox.exe" and 
        process.code_signature.subject_name == "Mozilla Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)]

Stage 2: api

[api where event.category == "intrusion_detection" and
  process.Ext.api.behaviors in ("shellcode", "allocate_shellcode", "execute_shellcode") and
  not process.Ext.api.name in ("SetWindowsHookEx", "NtQueueApcThread") and process.Ext.api.parameters.size > 4096 and
  not process.Ext.api.summary like
                      ("VirtualProtect( user32.dll,*)",
                       "VirtualProtect( clr.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( mscorwks.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( pidgenx.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( sop_check.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( 7-zip.dll,*",
                       "VirtualProtect( umppc*",
                       "VirtualProtect( brc???.tmp,*") and
  not _arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry,
                   $entry.protection_provenance like ("Kernel", "Kernel|*", "hmpalert.dll", "bdhkm32.dll", "tmmon.dll", "ftapihook32.dll")) and
  not process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary like
        ("ntdll.dll|Unknown|umppc*.dll|ntdll.dll",
         "ntdll.dll|wow64.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ftapihook32.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ntdll.dll")]

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.code_signature.subject_nameeqMozilla Corporationexcludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Mozilla Corporation"
process.code_signature.trustedeqtrueexcludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true"
process.executableeq?:\FirefoxPortable\App\Firefox\firefox.exeexcludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\FirefoxPortable\App\Firefox\firefox.exe"
process.code_signature.subject_nameinVMware, Inc., Veeam Software Group GmbHexcludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"VMware, Inc." field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Veeam Software Group GmbH"
process.Ext.device.nt_namestarts_with\Device\HarddiskVolumeexcludes:process.Ext.device.nt_name field:"process.Ext.device.nt_name" value:"\Device\HarddiskVolume"
process.Ext.device.vendor_ideqCitrixexcludes:process.Ext.device.vendor_id field:"process.Ext.device.vendor_id" value:"Citrix"
process.executablestarts_withC:\excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"C:\"
process.thread.Ext.call_stackarray_any(no value, null check)excludes:process.thread.Ext.call_stack
process.Ext.api.nameinNtQueueApcThread, SetWindowsHookExexcludes:process.Ext.api.name field:"process.Ext.api.name" value:"NtQueueApcThread" field:"process.Ext.api.name" value:"SetWindowsHookEx"
process.Ext.api.summarywildcardVirtualProtect( user32.dll,*), VirtualProtect( clr.dll,*, VirtualProtect( mscorwks.dll,*, VirtualProtect( pidgenx.dll,*, VirtualProtect( sop_check.dll,*, VirtualProtect( 7-zip.dll,*, VirtualProtect( umppc*, VirtualProtect( brc???.tmp,*excludes:process.Ext.api.summary
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summarywildcardntdll.dll|Unknown|umppc*.dll|ntdll.dll, ntdll.dll|wow64.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ftapihook32.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ntdll.dllexcludes:process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary field:"process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary" value:"ntdll.dll|Unknown|umppc*.dll|ntdll.dll" field:"process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary" value:"ntdll.dll|wow64.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ftapihook32.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ntdll.dll"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
event.categoryeq
  • intrusion_detection corpus 2 (elastic 2)
field:"event.category" kind:eq value:"intrusion_detection"
process.Ext.api.behaviorsin
  • allocate_shellcode corpus 9 (elastic 9)
  • execute_shellcode corpus 3 (elastic 3)
  • shellcode corpus 2 (elastic 2)
field:"process.Ext.api.behaviors" kind:in
process.Ext.api.parameters.sizegt
  • 4096 transforms: number corpus 5 (elastic 5)
field:"process.Ext.api.parameters.size" kind:gt value:"4096"
process.Ext.device.product_idwildcard
  • USB *
  • Virtual DVD-ROM
  • Virtual Disk
field:"process.Ext.device.product_id" kind:wildcard