Detection rules › Elastic
Transacted File Activity via an Unsigned DLL
Identifies the creation of a transacted file by an unsigned DLL. This may indicate an attempt to use Transactional NTFS to execute arbitrary code in the address space of a running process, without committing the code to disk.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the creation of a transacted file by an unsigned DLL. This may indicate an attempt to use Transactional NTFS
to execute arbitrary code in the address space of a running process, without committing the code to disk.
"""
id = "e80eb716-d5b0-4e85-b778-b9a4f3d6e303"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Transacted File Activity via an Unsigned DLL"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.2"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
[library where event.action == "load" and process.pid != 4 and not dll.code_signature.status : "trusted" and
(dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time < 500 or
dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time < 500 or
(dll.Ext.device.product_id : ("Virtual DVD-ROM", "Virtual Disk","USB *") and not dll.path : "C:\\*")
)] as event0
[file where event.action == "overwrite" and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info: "*\\kernel32.dll!CreateFileTransacted*") and
stringcontains~(process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary, concat("kernel32.dll|", event0.dll.name))]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: library
[library where event.action == "load" and process.pid != 4 and not dll.code_signature.status : "trusted" and
(dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time < 500 or
dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time < 500 or
(dll.Ext.device.product_id : ("Virtual DVD-ROM", "Virtual Disk","USB *") and not dll.path : "C:\\*")
)] as event0
Stage 2: file
[file where event.action == "overwrite" and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info: "*\\kernel32.dll!CreateFileTransacted*") and
stringcontains~(process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary, concat("kernel32.dll|", event0.dll.name))]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.code_signature.status | eq | trusted | excludes:dll.code_signature.status field:"dll.code_signature.status" value:"trusted" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.Ext.device.product_id | wildcard |
| field:"dll.Ext.device.product_id" kind:wildcard |
dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time | lt |
| field:"dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time" kind:lt value:"500" |
dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time | lt |
| field:"dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time" kind:lt value:"500" |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq |
process.pid | ne |
| field:"process_id" kind:ne value:"4" |
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary | contains |
| field:"process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary" kind:contains |