Detection rules › Elastic
Unsigned DLL Loaded by an Elastic Signed Binary
Identifies the load of an unsigned or untrusted DLL by an Elastic signed binary. This may indicate a potential DLL sideloading attempt.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the load of an unsigned or untrusted DLL by an Elastic signed binary. This may indicate a potential DLL
sideloading attempt.
"""
id = "b3edbd4f-d829-49fe-a638-8ef2dc56e8fd"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unsigned DLL Loaded by an Elastic Signed Binary"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.19"
query = '''
library where
process.code_signature.subject_name == "Elasticsearch, Inc." and
(dll.code_signature.exists == false or
(dll.code_signature.trusted == false and not dll.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorExpired", "errorCode_endpoint*"))) and
/* loaded from current dir */
endswith~(substring(dll.path, 0, length(dll.path) - (length(dll.name) + 1)), substring(process.executable, 0, length(process.executable) - (length(process.name) + 1))) and
not startswith~(dll.name, process.name)
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.0.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1574.001"
name = "DLL"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.0.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: library
library where
process.code_signature.subject_name == "Elasticsearch, Inc." and
(dll.code_signature.exists == false or
(dll.code_signature.trusted == false and not dll.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorExpired", "errorCode_endpoint*"))) and
endswith~(substring(dll.path, 0, length(dll.path) - (length(dll.name) + 1)), substring(process.executable, 0, length(process.executable) - (length(process.name) + 1))) and
not startswith~(dll.name, process.name)
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.name | starts_with | process.name | excludes:dll.name field:"dll.name" value:"process.name" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.