Detection rules › Elastic
Unusual Process Extension
Identifies processes running with unusual extensions that are not typically valid for Windows executables.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | T1036.008 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body elastic
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/23"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/05/21"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = "Identifies processes running with unusual extensions that are not typically valid for Windows executables.\n"
from = "now-119m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process-*"]
interval = "60m"
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unusual Process Extension"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "800e01be-a7a4-46d0-8de9-69f3c9582b44"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Rule Type: BBR",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.executable : "?*" and
not process.name : ("*.exe", "*.com", "*.scr", "*.tmp", "*.dat") and
not process.executable :
(
"MemCompression",
"Registry",
"vmmem",
"vmmemWSL",
"?:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SupportAssistAgent\\*.p5x",
"?:\\Program Files\\Docker\\Docker\\com.docker.service",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Intel\\AGS\\Libs\\AGSRunner.bin",
"\\Device\\Mup\\*\\Software Management\\Select.Html.dep",
"?:\\DJJApplications\\MedicalRecords\\bin\\Select.Html.dep",
"?:\\ProgramData\\Software Management\\Select.Html.dep",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\EnCase Applications\\Examiner Service\\EnCase64\\enhkey.dll",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Panda Security\\WAC\\PSNAEInj64.dll",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Johnson Controls\\LicenseActivator\\crp32002.ngn"
) and
not (
(process.name : "C9632CF058AE4321B6B0B5EA39B710FE" and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Dell Inc") or
(process.name : "*.upd" and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Bloomberg LP") or
(process.name: "FD552E21-686E-413C-931D-3B82A9D29F3B" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "Adobe Inc.") or
(process.name: "3B91051C-AE82-43C9-BCEF-0309CD2DD9EB" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "McAfee, LLC") or
(process.name: "soffice.bin" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "The Document Foundation") or
(process.name: ("VeeamVixProxy_*", "{????????-????-????-????-????????????}") and process.code_signature.subject_name: "Veeam Software Group GmbH") or
(process.name: "1cv8p64.bin" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "LLC 1C-Soft") or
(process.name: "AGSRunner.bin" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "Intel Corporation")
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1036.008"
name = "Masquerade File Type"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/008/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.executable : "?*" and
not process.name : ("*.exe", "*.com", "*.scr", "*.tmp", "*.dat") and
not process.executable :
(
"MemCompression",
"Registry",
"vmmem",
"vmmemWSL",
"?:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SupportAssistAgent\\*.p5x",
"?:\\Program Files\\Docker\\Docker\\com.docker.service",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Intel\\AGS\\Libs\\AGSRunner.bin",
"\\Device\\Mup\\*\\Software Management\\Select.Html.dep",
"?:\\DJJApplications\\MedicalRecords\\bin\\Select.Html.dep",
"?:\\ProgramData\\Software Management\\Select.Html.dep",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\EnCase Applications\\Examiner Service\\EnCase64\\enhkey.dll",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Panda Security\\WAC\\PSNAEInj64.dll",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Johnson Controls\\LicenseActivator\\crp32002.ngn"
) and
not (
(process.name : "C9632CF058AE4321B6B0B5EA39B710FE" and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Dell Inc") or
(process.name : "*.upd" and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Bloomberg LP") or
(process.name: "FD552E21-686E-413C-931D-3B82A9D29F3B" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "Adobe Inc.") or
(process.name: "3B91051C-AE82-43C9-BCEF-0309CD2DD9EB" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "McAfee, LLC") or
(process.name: "soffice.bin" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "The Document Foundation") or
(process.name: ("VeeamVixProxy_*", "{????????-????-????-????-????????????}") and process.code_signature.subject_name: "Veeam Software Group GmbH") or
(process.name: "1cv8p64.bin" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "LLC 1C-Soft") or
(process.name: "AGSRunner.bin" and process.code_signature.subject_name: "Intel Corporation")
)
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | Adobe Inc. |
process.name | eq | FD552E21-686E-413C-931D-3B82A9D29F3B |
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | Bloomberg LP |
process.name | ends_with | .upd |
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | Dell Inc |
process.name | eq | C9632CF058AE4321B6B0B5EA39B710FE |
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | Intel Corporation |
process.name | eq | AGSRunner.bin |
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | LLC 1C-Soft |
process.name | eq | 1cv8p64.bin |
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | McAfee, LLC |
process.name | eq | 3B91051C-AE82-43C9-BCEF-0309CD2DD9EB |
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | The Document Foundation |
process.name | eq | soffice.bin |
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | Veeam Software Group GmbH |
process.name | wildcard | VeeamVixProxy_*, {????????-????-????-????-????????????} |
process.executable | wildcard | MemCompression, Registry, vmmem, vmmemWSL, ?:\Program Files\Dell\SupportAssistAgent\*.p5x, ?:\Program Files\Docker\Docker\com.docker.service, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Intel\AGS\Libs\AGSRunner.bin, \Device\Mup\*\Software Management\Select.Html.dep, ?:\DJJApplications\MedicalRecords\bin\Select.Html.dep, ?:\ProgramData\Software Management\Select.Html.dep, ?:\Program Files (x86)\EnCase Applications\Examiner Service\EnCase64\enhkey.dll, ?:\Program Files (x86)\Panda Security\WAC\PSNAEInj64.dll, ?:\Program Files (x86)\Johnson Controls\LicenseActivator\crp32002.ngn |
process.name | ends_with | .exe, .com, .scr, .tmp, .dat |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
|
process.executable | wildcard |
|