Detection rules › Elastic
Unusual Process Execution on WBEM Path
Identifies unusual processes running from the WBEM path, uncommon outside WMI-related Windows processes.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/08/23"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/03/24"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = "Identifies unusual processes running from the WBEM path, uncommon outside WMI-related Windows processes.\n"
from = "now-119m"
index = [
"endgame-*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
"logs-system.security*",
"logs-windows.*",
"winlogbeat-*",
]
interval = "60m"
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unusual Process Execution on WBEM Path"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "1f460f12-a3cf-4105-9ebb-f788cc63f365"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Rule Type: BBR",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\*", "?:\\Windows\\SysWow64\\wbem\\*") and
not process.name : (
"mofcomp.exe",
"scrcons.exe",
"unsecapp.exe",
"wbemtest.exe",
"winmgmt.exe",
"wmiadap.exe",
"wmiapsrv.exe",
"wmic.exe",
"wmiprvse.exe"
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1036.005"
name = "Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\*", "?:\\Windows\\SysWow64\\wbem\\*") and
not process.name : (
"mofcomp.exe",
"scrcons.exe",
"unsecapp.exe",
"wbemtest.exe",
"winmgmt.exe",
"wmiadap.exe",
"wmiapsrv.exe",
"wmic.exe",
"wmiprvse.exe"
)
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.name | eq | mofcomp.exe, scrcons.exe, unsecapp.exe, wbemtest.exe, winmgmt.exe, wmiadap.exe, wmiapsrv.exe, wmic.exe, wmiprvse.exe | excludes:process.name |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard |