Detection rules › Elastic
User Account Control Disabled via Registry
Identifies attempts to disable Users Account Control via registry modification. Malware may disable UAC to run with high integrity.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Defense Impairment |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies attempts to disable Users Account Control via registry modification. Malware may disable UAC to run with high
integrity.
"""
id = "00976339-61b4-4108-98e5-da0b19b0c680"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "User Account Control Disabled via Registry"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-lua-settings-enablelua",
]
version = "1.0.6"
query = '''
registry where not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA" and
registry.data.strings : "0" and
(process.code_signature.trusted == false or
process.code_signature.exists == false or
process.name : ("msiexec.exe", "rundll32.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe"))
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.1.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.002"
name = "Bypass User Account Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1112"
name = "Modify Registry"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1562"
name = "Impair Defenses"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1562.001"
name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.1.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: registry
registry where not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA" and
registry.data.strings : "0" and
(process.code_signature.trusted == false or
process.code_signature.exists == false or
process.name : ("msiexec.exe", "rundll32.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe"))
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
user.id | eq | S-1-5-18, S-1-5-19, S-1-5-20 | excludes:user.id field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-18" field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-19" field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-20" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.code_signature.exists | eq |
| field:"process.code_signature.exists" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq |
| field:"process.code_signature.trusted" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |
registry.data.strings | wildcard |
| field:"Details" kind:wildcard value:"0" |
registry.path | wildcard |
| field:"TargetObject" kind:wildcard value:"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA" |