Detection rules › Elastic

Windows Error Manager/Reporting Masquerading

Time window
5m
Sequence by
process.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching command-line and process executable values performing outgoing network connections. This may be indicative of a masquerading attempt to evade suspicious child process behavior detections.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching
command-line and process executable values performing outgoing network connections. This may be indicative of a
masquerading attempt to evade suspicious child process behavior detections.
"""
id = "3d16f5f9-da4c-4b15-a501-505761b75ca6"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Windows Error Manager/Reporting Masquerading"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/revisiting-blister-new-developments-of-the-blister-loader"]
version = "1.0.34"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=5m
  [process where event.action == "start" and
   process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe") and process.args_count == 1 and process.parent.executable != null and
   not (process.args : "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wermgr.exe  -upload" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe")]
  [network where event.action == "connection_attempted" and process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe")]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"

[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 5m, correlated by process.entity_id.

Stage 1: process

[process where event.action == "start" and
   process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe") and process.args_count == 1 and process.parent.executable != null and
   not (process.args : "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wermgr.exe  -upload" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe")]

Stage 2: network

[network where event.action == "connection_attempted" and process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe")]

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.argseqC:\WINDOWS\system32\wermgr.exe -uploadexcludes:process.args field:"process.args" value:"C:\WINDOWS\system32\wermgr.exe -upload"
process.parent.executableeqC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeexcludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • connection_attempted corpus 73 (elastic 73)
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq
process.args_counteq
  • 1 transforms: number corpus 49 (elastic 49)
field:"process.args_count" kind:eq value:"1"
process.namewildcard
  • WerFault.exe corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • wermgr.exe corpus 7 (elastic 5, splunk 2)
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard
process.parent.executableis_not_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"ParentImage" kind:is_not_null