Detection rules › Elastic
Windows Error Manager/Reporting Masquerading
Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching command-line and process executable values performing outgoing network connections. This may be indicative of a masquerading attempt to evade suspicious child process behavior detections.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching
command-line and process executable values performing outgoing network connections. This may be indicative of a
masquerading attempt to evade suspicious child process behavior detections.
"""
id = "3d16f5f9-da4c-4b15-a501-505761b75ca6"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Windows Error Manager/Reporting Masquerading"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/revisiting-blister-new-developments-of-the-blister-loader"]
version = "1.0.34"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=5m
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe") and process.args_count == 1 and process.parent.executable != null and
not (process.args : "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wermgr.exe -upload" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe")]
[network where event.action == "connection_attempted" and process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 5m, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe") and process.args_count == 1 and process.parent.executable != null and
not (process.args : "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wermgr.exe -upload" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe")]
Stage 2: network
[network where event.action == "connection_attempted" and process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.args | eq | C:\WINDOWS\system32\wermgr.exe -upload | excludes:process.args field:"process.args" value:"C:\WINDOWS\system32\wermgr.exe -upload" |
process.parent.executable | eq | C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe | excludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq |
process.args_count | eq |
| field:"process.args_count" kind:eq value:"1" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.executable | is_not_null | field:"ParentImage" kind:is_not_null |