Detection rules › Elastic
Windows Socket Creation from Unbacked Memory
Identifies the creation of a Windows network socket from unbacked memory, this may indicate process code injection.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = "Identifies the creation of a Windows network socket from unbacked memory, this may indicate process code injection."
id = "59a55372-5b1a-4a72-bd6e-9a55cf9298b4"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Windows Socket Creation from Unbacked Memory"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.3"
query = '''
api where process.Ext.api.name == "VirtualProtect" and
process.Ext.api.metadata.target_address_name == "mswsock.dll" and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary in ("ntdll.dll|apphelp.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ws2_32.dll|Unbacked",
"ntdll.dll|wow64.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|apphelp.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ws2_32.dll|Unbacked") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info like "Unbacked*" and $entry.callsite_trailing_bytes : "?*") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info : "c:\\windows\\sys?????\\ws2_32.dll!WSASocket*") and
not process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.protection_provenance_path like ("c:\\windows\\microsoft.net\\framework64\\v*\\clr.dll", "c:\\program files\\dotnet\\shared\\microsoft.netcore.app\\*\\coreclr.dll")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.14.2"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1055"
name = "Process Injection"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.14.2"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: api
api where process.Ext.api.name == "VirtualProtect" and
process.Ext.api.metadata.target_address_name == "mswsock.dll" and
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary in ("ntdll.dll|apphelp.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ws2_32.dll|Unbacked",
"ntdll.dll|wow64.dll|wow64cpu.dll|wow64.dll|ntdll.dll|apphelp.dll|ntdll.dll|kernelbase.dll|ws2_32.dll|Unbacked") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info like "Unbacked*" and $entry.callsite_trailing_bytes : "?*") and
_arraysearch(process.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry, $entry.symbol_info : "c:\\windows\\sys?????\\ws2_32.dll!WSASocket*") and
not process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.protection_provenance_path like ("c:\\windows\\microsoft.net\\framework64\\v*\\clr.dll", "c:\\program files\\dotnet\\shared\\microsoft.netcore.app\\*\\coreclr.dll")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.protection_provenance_path | wildcard | c:\windows\microsoft.net\framework64\v*\clr.dll, c:\program files\dotnet\shared\microsoft.netcore.app\*\coreclr.dll | excludes:process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.protection_provenance_path field:"process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.protection_provenance_path" value:"c:\windows\microsoft.net\framework64\v*\clr.dll" field:"process.thread.Ext.call_stack_final_user_module.protection_provenance_path" value:"c:\program files\dotnet\shared\microsoft.netcore.app\*\coreclr.dll" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.Ext.api.metadata.target_address_name | eq |
| field:"process.Ext.api.metadata.target_address_name" kind:eq value:"mswsock.dll" |
process.Ext.api.name | eq |
| field:"process.Ext.api.name" kind:eq value:"VirtualProtect" |
process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary | in |
| field:"process.thread.Ext.call_stack_summary" kind:in |