Detection rules › Elastic
Process Discovery Using Built-in Tools
This rule identifies the execution of commands that can be used to enumerate running processes. Adversaries may enumerate processes to identify installed applications and security solutions.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery | T1057 Process Discovery |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body elastic
[metadata]
bypass_bbr_timing = true
creation_date = "2023/07/13"
integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/12/17"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
This rule identifies the execution of commands that can be used to enumerate running processes. Adversaries may
enumerate processes to identify installed applications and security solutions.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
"logs-system.security*",
"logs-windows.*",
"winlogbeat-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Process Discovery Using Built-in Tools"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "4982ac3e-d0ee-4818-b95d-d9522d689259"
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Rule Type: BBR",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.args != null and
not user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and process.parent.executable != null and
(
process.name :("PsList.exe", "qprocess.exe") or
(process.name : "powershell.exe" and process.args : ("*get-process*", "*Win32_Process*") and not process.parent.name in ("openaev-agent.exe", "cmd.exe", "Miro.exe", "Granola.exe", "Wispr Flow.exe")) or
(process.name : "wmic.exe" and process.args : ("process", "*Win32_Process*") and not process.parent.name in ("Code.exe", "node.exe", "javaw.exe", "java.exe", "asus_framework.exe", "Evernote.exe", "RingCentral.exe", "Avaya Cloud.exe", "Arduino IDE.exe")) or
(process.name : "tasklist.exe" and process.args_count == 1 and process.parent.args != "tasklist | findstr consent.exe") or
(process.name : "query.exe" and process.args : ("process", "imagename*", "csv", "/fi"))
) and
not process.working_directory like ("?:\\Program Files*", "D:\\*", "E:\\*") and
not process.parent.executable like ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1057"
name = "Process Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.args != null and
not user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and process.parent.executable != null and
(
process.name :("PsList.exe", "qprocess.exe") or
(process.name : "powershell.exe" and process.args : ("*get-process*", "*Win32_Process*") and not process.parent.name in ("openaev-agent.exe", "cmd.exe", "Miro.exe", "Granola.exe", "Wispr Flow.exe")) or
(process.name : "wmic.exe" and process.args : ("process", "*Win32_Process*") and not process.parent.name in ("Code.exe", "node.exe", "javaw.exe", "java.exe", "asus_framework.exe", "Evernote.exe", "RingCentral.exe", "Avaya Cloud.exe", "Arduino IDE.exe")) or
(process.name : "tasklist.exe" and process.args_count == 1 and process.parent.args != "tasklist | findstr consent.exe") or
(process.name : "query.exe" and process.args : ("process", "imagename*", "csv", "/fi"))
) and
not process.working_directory like ("?:\\Program Files*", "D:\\*", "E:\\*") and
not process.parent.executable like ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe")
Exclusions
Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values |
|---|---|---|
process.parent.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe, ?:\Program Files\*.exe |
process.working_directory | starts_with | ?:\Program Files, D:\, E:\ |
user.id | in | S-1-5-18, S-1-5-19, S-1-5-20 |
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
|
process.args | is_not_null | |
process.args | wildcard |
|
process.args_count | eq |
|
process.name | wildcard |
|
process.parent.args | ne |
|
process.parent.executable | is_not_null |