Detection rules › Elastic
System Reconnaissance from Unsigned Parent Followed by Network Connection
Identifies macOS system discovery commands used to collect the computer name and hardware UUID, executed by a child of an unsigned or untrusted process running from a user-writable path, followed within a short window by an outbound network connection to a named domain.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery | |
| Command & Control |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies macOS system discovery commands used to collect the computer name and hardware UUID, executed by a child of
an unsigned or untrusted process running from a user-writable path, followed within a short window by an outbound
network connection to a named domain.
"""
id = "a7c3e891-5f2d-4b8e-9d1a-6e4f8b2c0d1e"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "System Reconnaissance from Unsigned Parent Followed by Network Connection"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = [
"https://www.wiz.io/blog/threat-actors-target-crypto-orgs",
"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/",
]
version = "1.0.1"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=1m
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
(
process.command_line like "*scutil --get ComputerName*" or
process.command_line like~ "*ioreg*IOPlatformExpertDevice*IOPlatformUUID*"
) and
(process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or process.parent.code_signature.exists == false) and
process.parent.executable like ("/Users/*", "/private/tmp/*", "/tmp/*") and
not process.parent.executable like~ (
"/Users/*/.local/share/uv/python/*/bin/python*",
"/Users/*/Desktop/*"
) and
not process.parent.code_signature.signing_id like~ ("spawn-helper-*", "herdr-*")] by process.parent.entity_id
[network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
destination.domain != null] by process.entity_id
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1082"
name = "System Information Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1071.001"
name = "Web Protocols"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
(
process.command_line like "*scutil --get ComputerName*" or
process.command_line like~ "*ioreg*IOPlatformExpertDevice*IOPlatformUUID*"
) and
(process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or process.parent.code_signature.exists == false) and
process.parent.executable like ("/Users/*", "/private/tmp/*", "/tmp/*") and
not process.parent.executable like~ (
"/Users/*/.local/share/uv/python/*/bin/python*",
"/Users/*/Desktop/*"
) and
not process.parent.code_signature.signing_id like~ ("spawn-helper-*", "herdr-*")] by process.parent.entity_id
Stage 2: network
[network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
destination.domain != null] by process.entity_id
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.code_signature.signing_id | starts_with | spawn-helper-, herdr- | excludes:process.parent.code_signature.signing_id field:"process.parent.code_signature.signing_id" value:"spawn-helper-" field:"process.parent.code_signature.signing_id" value:"herdr-" |
process.parent.executable | wildcard | /Users/*/.local/share/uv/python/*/bin/python*, /Users/*/Desktop/* | excludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"/Users/*/.local/share/uv/python/*/bin/python*" field:"process.parent.executable" value:"/Users/*/Desktop/*" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
destination.domain | is_not_null | field:"DestinationHostname" kind:is_not_null | |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.command_line | wildcard |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.code_signature.exists | eq |
| field:"process.parent.code_signature.exists" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.parent.code_signature.trusted | eq |
| field:"process.parent.code_signature.trusted" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.parent.executable | wildcard |
| field:"ParentImage" kind:wildcard |