Detection rules › Elastic

System Reconnaissance from Unsigned Parent Followed by Network Connection

Time window
1m
Sequence by
process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies macOS system discovery commands used to collect the computer name and hardware UUID, executed by a child of an unsigned or untrusted process running from a user-writable path, followed within a short window by an outbound network connection to a named domain.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies macOS system discovery commands used to collect the computer name and hardware UUID, executed by a child of
an unsigned or untrusted process running from a user-writable path, followed within a short window by an outbound
network connection to a named domain.
"""
id = "a7c3e891-5f2d-4b8e-9d1a-6e4f8b2c0d1e"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "System Reconnaissance from Unsigned Parent Followed by Network Connection"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = [
    "https://www.wiz.io/blog/threat-actors-target-crypto-orgs",
    "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/",
]
version = "1.0.1"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=1m
  [process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
   (
     process.command_line like "*scutil --get ComputerName*" or
     process.command_line like~ "*ioreg*IOPlatformExpertDevice*IOPlatformUUID*"
   ) and
   (process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or process.parent.code_signature.exists == false) and
   process.parent.executable like ("/Users/*", "/private/tmp/*", "/tmp/*") and
   not process.parent.executable like~ (
     "/Users/*/.local/share/uv/python/*/bin/python*",
     "/Users/*/Desktop/*"
   ) and
   not process.parent.code_signature.signing_id like~ ("spawn-helper-*", "herdr-*")] by process.parent.entity_id
  [network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
   destination.domain != null] by process.entity_id
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1082"
name = "System Information Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1071.001"
name = "Web Protocols"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id.

Stage 1: process

[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
   (
     process.command_line like "*scutil --get ComputerName*" or
     process.command_line like~ "*ioreg*IOPlatformExpertDevice*IOPlatformUUID*"
   ) and
   (process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or process.parent.code_signature.exists == false) and
   process.parent.executable like ("/Users/*", "/private/tmp/*", "/tmp/*") and
   not process.parent.executable like~ (
     "/Users/*/.local/share/uv/python/*/bin/python*",
     "/Users/*/Desktop/*"
   ) and
   not process.parent.code_signature.signing_id like~ ("spawn-helper-*", "herdr-*")] by process.parent.entity_id

Stage 2: network

[network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
   destination.domain != null] by process.entity_id

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.