Detection rules › Elastic

Windows System Information Discovery

Status
production
Kind
building block (feeds higher-level correlation rules; not a standalone alert)
Severity
low
Time window
9m
Author
Elastic
Source
github.com/elastic/detection-rules

Detects the execution of commands used to discover information about the system, which attackers may use after compromising a system to gain situational awareness.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body elastic

[metadata]
bypass_bbr_timing = true
creation_date = "2023/07/06"
integration = ["windows", "endpoint", "system"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/03/24"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
building_block_type = "default"
description = """
Detects the execution of commands used to discover information about the system, which attackers may use after
compromising a system to gain situational awareness.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
    "endgame-*",
    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
    "logs-system.security*",
    "logs-windows.*",
    "winlogbeat-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Windows System Information Discovery"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "51176ed2-2d90-49f2-9f3d-17196428b169"
severity = "low"
tags = [
    "Domain: Endpoint",
    "OS: Windows",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Discovery",
    "Rule Type: BBR",
    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
(
  (
    process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args : "ver*" and not
    process.parent.executable : (
        "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Keybase\\upd.exe",
        "?:\\Users\\*\\python*.exe"
    )
  ) or 
  process.name : ("systeminfo.exe", "hostname.exe") or 
  (process.name : "wmic.exe" and process.args : "os" and process.args : "get")
) and not
process.parent.executable : (
    "?:\\Program Files\\*",
    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
    "?:\\ProgramData\\*"
) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1082"
name = "System Information Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1047"
name = "Windows Management Instrumentation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.003"
name = "Windows Command Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
(
  (
    process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.args : "ver*" and not
    process.parent.executable : (
        "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Keybase\\upd.exe",
        "?:\\Users\\*\\python*.exe"
    )
  ) or 
  process.name : ("systeminfo.exe", "hostname.exe") or 
  (process.name : "wmic.exe" and process.args : "os" and process.args : "get")
) and not
process.parent.executable : (
    "?:\\Program Files\\*",
    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
    "?:\\ProgramData\\*"
) and not user.id : "S-1-5-18"

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

FieldKindExcluded values
process.parent.executablestarts_with?:\Program Files\, ?:\Program Files (x86)\, ?:\ProgramData\
user.ideqS-1-5-18

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
event.typeeq
  • start corpus 606 (elastic 606)
process.argswildcard
  • get corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • os
  • ver*
process.namewildcard
  • cmd.exe corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
  • hostname.exe corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • systeminfo.exe corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • wmic.exe corpus 47 (splunk 27, elastic 20)