Kubernetes Anonymous User Create/Update/Patch Pods Request

Status: production
Severity: medium
Author: Elastic
Source: github.com/elastic/detection-rules

This rule detects attempts to create, update, or patch pods by an anonymous user. An anonymous user is a user that is not authenticated or authorized to access the Kubernetes API server. Creating, updating, or patching pods is a common activity for attackers to gain access to the cluster and execute commands.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1610` Deploy Container

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Kubernetes-pods	create-pods	create pods
Kubernetes-pods	update-pods	update pods
Kubernetes-pods	patch-pods	patch pods

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

Container With A hostPath Mount Created (Sigma)
Creation Of Pod In System Namespace (Sigma)
Kubernetes Container Created with Excessive Linux Capabilities (Elastic)
Kubernetes Create or Update Privileged Pod (Splunk)
Kubernetes Ephemeral Container Added to Pod (Elastic)
Kubernetes Pod Created in Default Namespace (Splunk)
Kubernetes Pod Created with a Sensitive hostPath Volume (Elastic)
Kubernetes Pod Created With HostIPC (Elastic)

Rule body elastic

[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/02/02"
integration = ["kubernetes"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/04/10"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule detects attempts to create, update, or patch pods by an anonymous user. An anonymous user is a user that
is not authenticated or authorized to access the Kubernetes API server. Creating, updating, or patching pods is a common
activity for attackers to gain access to the cluster and execute commands.
"""
index = ["logs-kubernetes.audit_logs-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Kubernetes Anonymous User Create/Update/Patch Pods Request"
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "3a01e5c6-ce01-46d7-ac9f-52dc349695fb"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Data Source: Kubernetes",
    "Domain: Kubernetes",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Execution",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide"
    ]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
any where data_stream.dataset == "kubernetes.audit_logs" and (
    kubernetes.audit.user.username in ("system:anonymous", "system:unauthenticated") or
    kubernetes.audit.user.username == null or
    kubernetes.audit.user.username == ""
  ) and kubernetes.audit.level in ("RequestResponse", "ResponseComplete", "Request") and kubernetes.audit.verb in ("create", "update", "patch") and
kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource == "pods"

'''

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1610"
name = "Deploy Container"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1610/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `any`

any where data_stream.dataset == "kubernetes.audit_logs" and (
    kubernetes.audit.user.username in ("system:anonymous", "system:unauthenticated") or
    kubernetes.audit.user.username == null or
    kubernetes.audit.user.username == ""
  ) and kubernetes.audit.level in ("RequestResponse", "ResponseComplete", "Request") and kubernetes.audit.verb in ("create", "update", "patch") and
kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource == "pods"

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`data_stream.dataset`	eq	`kubernetes.audit_logs`
`kubernetes.audit.level`	in	`Request` `RequestResponse` `ResponseComplete`
`kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource`	eq	`pods`
`kubernetes.audit.user.username`	in	`system:anonymous` `system:unauthenticated`
`kubernetes.audit.user.username`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`kubernetes.audit.verb`	in	`create` `patch` `update`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Kubernetes Anonymous User Create/Update/Patch Pods Request

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body elastic

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `any`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Kubernetes Anonymous User Create/Update/Patch Pods Request

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body elastic

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: any

Indicators

Stage 1: `any`