Azure AKS Attempted User Exec into Pod

[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/07/09"
integration = ["azure"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/07/09"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects an AKS (Azure Kubernetes Service) identity establishing an exec session into a pod. Interactive command
execution inside a workload via kubectl exec is a common post-compromise technique used to access secrets, run tooling,
and expand access from a foothold container. Node, control-plane, and kube-system service account identities are
excluded, so workload service accounts and users, the identities an adversary is most likely to abuse, remain in scope.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Administrators routinely exec into pods for troubleshooting. Baseline expected users and target pods, then exclude
    known break-glass or operator identities after review.
    """,
]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-azure.platformlogs-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Azure AKS Attempted User Exec into Pod"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Azure AKS Attempted User Exec into Pod

AKS kube-audit events are carried under the flattened `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.*` subtree and share the ARM
operation `event.action: Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read`. This rule alerts on a
`pods/exec` request by an identity that is not node, control-plane, or kube-system infrastructure. Exec into a pod grants
an interactive shell inside the workload, which adversaries use to read mounted secrets, pivot, and stage tooling.

### Possible investigation steps

- Review the acting identity in `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.username` and its groups in
  `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.groups`, and the target pod in
  `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.name` / `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.namespace`.
- Determine whether the target pod holds sensitive data, cluster credentials, or a mounted service account token.
- Inspect the exec request path and command context in `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.requestURI` and the client in
  `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.userAgent` (interactive `kubectl` vs a scripted client).
- Evaluate the source in `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.sourceIPs`. Pivot on it for related API activity, secret
  reads, or RBAC changes from the same identity.

### False positive analysis

- Approved admin debugging; exclude stable operator or break-glass identities after review.
- CI/CD or platform tooling that execs into workloads may match; exclude verified service accounts and namespaces.

### Response and remediation

- If unauthorized, revoke the identity's tokens and kubeconfig and terminate the exec session.
- Inspect the target pod for tampering, dropped tooling, or accessed secrets, and rotate any credentials it exposed.
- Collect kube-audit and identity artifacts per incident response procedures.
"""
references = [
    "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-application/get-shell-running-container/",
    "https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/",
    "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "8f131efa-0284-465f-a360-da23e5562dd1"
setup = "The Azure Fleet integration collecting AKS diagnostic logs with the `kube-audit` category forwarded through Event Hub into the `azure.platformlogs` data stream is required for this rule."
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Domain: Kubernetes",
    "Data Source: Azure",
    "Data Source: Azure Platform Logs",
    "Data Source: Kubernetes",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Execution",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"

query = '''
data_stream.dataset:azure.platformlogs and
  event.action:"Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read" and
  azure.platformlogs.category:"kube-audit" and
  azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.resource:"pods" and azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.subresource:"exec" and
  azure.platformlogs.properties.log.verb:("create" or "get") and
  not azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.username:(
    system\:node\:* or "aksService" or "hcpService" or "readinessChecker" or
    system\:serviceaccount\:kube-system\:*
  )
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1609"
name = "Container Administration Command"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
    "@timestamp",
    "event.action",
    "azure.platformlogs.category",
    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.verb",
    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.username",
    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.sourceIPs",
    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.resource",
    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.subresource",
    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.namespace",
    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.name"
]