Detection rules › Elastic
Linux Reverse Shell via Child
Detects the creation of a reverse shell through a shell with suspicious command line arguments. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Command & Control |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects the creation of a reverse shell through a shell with suspicious command line arguments. Attackers may spawn
reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system.
"""
id = "00a97e57-4834-47ec-880d-48ce3783e0b4"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Linux Reverse Shell via Child"
os_list = ["linux"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
version = "1.0.7"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=5s
[network where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and
process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "socat") and destination.ip != null and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")]
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and (
process.args in ("-i", "-il", "-li") or
(process.parent.name == "socat" and process.parent.command_line like~ "*exec*")
)
]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.5.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 1
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.5.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 5s, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: network
[network where event.type == "start" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and
process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "socat") and destination.ip != null and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")]
Stage 2: process
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
process.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and (
process.args in ("-i", "-il", "-li") or
(process.parent.name == "socat" and process.parent.command_line like~ "*exec*")
)
]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
destination.ip | cidr_match | 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 224.0.0.0/4, ::1 | excludes:destination.ip |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
destination.ip | is_not_null | field:"dest_ip" kind:is_not_null | |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec" |
event.action | in |
| field:"EventType" kind:in |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.args | in |
| field:"process.args" kind:in |
process.name | in |
| field:"process_name" kind:in |
process.parent.command_line | wildcard |
| field:"ParentCommandLine" kind:wildcard value:"*exec*" |
process.parent.name | eq |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:eq value:"socat" |