Detection rules › Elastic

Linux Reverse Shell via setsid and nohup

Time window
3s
Sequence by
process.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Detects the sequence of a network event through a binary that is capable of spawning reverse connections, after which a setsid/nohup process is spawned. Attackers may use these commands to establish persistence on a target system through a reverse shell or to execute commands in the background.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Detects the sequence of a network event through a binary that is capable of spawning reverse connections, after which a
setsid/nohup process is spawned. Attackers may use these commands to establish persistence on a target system through a
reverse shell or to execute commands in the background.
"""
id = "3cce374b-c877-4419-8230-08f1a6b04da2"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Linux Reverse Shell via setsid and nohup"
os_list = ["linux"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
version = "1.0.6"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=3s
  [network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and (
    process.name in (
      "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "netcat.openbsd",
      "netcat.traditional", "nc.openbsd", "nc.traditional"
    ) or
    process.name like ("python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby*", "lua*")
  ) and not (destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
       destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
       "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
       "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
       "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
       "FF00::/8", "172.31.0.0/16"
      )
    )
  ]
  [process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name in ("setsid", "nohup")]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 1

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 3s, correlated by process.entity_id.

Stage 1: network

[network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and (
    process.name in (
      "bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "netcat.openbsd",
      "netcat.traditional", "nc.openbsd", "nc.traditional"
    ) or
    process.name like ("python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby*", "lua*")
  ) and not (destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
       destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
       "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
       "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
       "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
       "FF00::/8", "172.31.0.0/16"
      )
    )
  ]

Stage 2: process

[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name in ("setsid", "nohup")]

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
destination.ipcidr_match10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.0.0.0/24, 192.0.0.0/29, 192.0.0.8/32, 192.0.0.9/32, 192.0.0.10/32, 192.0.0.170/32, 192.0.0.171/32, 192.0.2.0/24, 192.31.196.0/24, 192.52.193.0/24, 192.168.0.0/16, 192.88.99.0/24, 224.0.0.0/4, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.175.48.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, 240.0.0.0/4, ::1, FE80::/10, FF00::/8, 172.31.0.0/16excludes:destination.ip
destination.ipeq0.0.0.0excludes:destination.ip field:"destination.ip" value:"0.0.0.0"
destination.ipis_null(no value, null check)excludes:destination.ip

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • connection_attempted
  • exec
field:"EventType" kind:eq
event.typeeq
  • start
field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start"
process.namein
  • bash
  • csh
  • dash
  • fish
  • ksh
  • nc
  • nc.openbsd
  • nc.traditional
  • ncat
  • netcat
  • netcat.openbsd
  • netcat.traditional
  • nohup
  • setsid
  • sh
  • tcsh
  • zsh
field:"process_name" kind:in
process.namewildcard
  • lua*
  • perl
  • php*
  • python*
  • ruby*
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard