Detection rules › Elastic

Linux Reverse Shell via Suspicious Utility

Time window
5s
Sequence by
process.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Detects the creation of a reverse shell through a suspicious process chain spawned via a utility with suspicious command line arguments. Reverse shells spawned by the specified utilities that are initialized from a single process followed by a network connection attempt will be captured through this rule. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish persistence onto a target system.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Detects the creation of a reverse shell through a suspicious process chain spawned via a utility with suspicious command
line arguments. Reverse shells spawned by the specified utilities that are initialized from a single process followed by
a network connection attempt will be captured through this rule. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish
persistence onto a target system.
"""
id = "c71b9783-ca42-4532-8eb3-e8f2fe32ff39"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Linux Reverse Shell via Suspicious Utility"
os_list = ["linux"]
reference = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
version = "1.0.9"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=5s
  [process where event.type == "start" and event.action  == "exec" and (
    (process.name like "python*" and process.args == "-c" and process.command_line like~ (
     "*import*pty*spawn*", "*import*subprocess*call*"
    )) or
    (process.name like "perl*" and process.args == "-e" and process.command_line like~ "*socket*" and process.command_line like~ (
     "*exec*", "*system*"
    )) or
    (process.name like "ruby*" and process.args in ("-e", "-rsocket") and process.command_line like~ (
     "*TCPSocket.new*", "*TCPSocket.open*"
     )) or
    (process.name like "lua*" and process.args == "-e" and process.command_line like~ "*socket.tcp*" and process.command_line like~ (
     "*io.popen*", "*os.execute*"
    )) or
    (process.name like "php*" and process.args == "-r" and process.command_line like~ "*fsockopen*" and process.command_line like~ "*/bin/*sh*") or 
    (process.name == "node" and process.args == "-e" and process.command_line like~ "*spawn*sh*" and process.command_line like~ "*connect*") or
    (process.name in ("awk", "gawk", "mawk", "nawk") and process.command_line like~ "*/inet/tcp/*")
   )]
  [network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and 
   process.name like ("python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "*awk", "node") and not (
     destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
       destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
       "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
       "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
       "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
       "FF00::/8"
       )
    )]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.5.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 1

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.5.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 5s, correlated by process.entity_id.

Stage 1: process

[process where event.type == "start" and event.action  == "exec" and (
    (process.name like "python*" and process.args == "-c" and process.command_line like~ (
     "*import*pty*spawn*", "*import*subprocess*call*"
    )) or
    (process.name like "perl*" and process.args == "-e" and process.command_line like~ "*socket*" and process.command_line like~ (
     "*exec*", "*system*"
    )) or
    (process.name like "ruby*" and process.args in ("-e", "-rsocket") and process.command_line like~ (
     "*TCPSocket.new*", "*TCPSocket.open*"
     )) or
    (process.name like "lua*" and process.args == "-e" and process.command_line like~ "*socket.tcp*" and process.command_line like~ (
     "*io.popen*", "*os.execute*"
    )) or
    (process.name like "php*" and process.args == "-r" and process.command_line like~ "*fsockopen*" and process.command_line like~ "*/bin/*sh*") or 
    (process.name == "node" and process.args == "-e" and process.command_line like~ "*spawn*sh*" and process.command_line like~ "*connect*") or
    (process.name in ("awk", "gawk", "mawk", "nawk") and process.command_line like~ "*/inet/tcp/*")
   )]

Stage 2: network

[network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and 
   process.name like ("python*", "php*", "perl", "ruby", "lua*", "*awk", "node") and not (
     destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
       destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
       "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
       "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
       "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
       "FF00::/8"
       )
    )]

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
destination.ipcidr_match10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.0.0.0/24, 192.0.0.0/29, 192.0.0.8/32, 192.0.0.9/32, 192.0.0.10/32, 192.0.0.170/32, 192.0.0.171/32, 192.0.2.0/24, 192.31.196.0/24, 192.52.193.0/24, 192.168.0.0/16, 192.88.99.0/24, 224.0.0.0/4, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.175.48.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, 240.0.0.0/4, ::1, FE80::/10, FF00::/8excludes:destination.ip
destination.ipeq0.0.0.0excludes:destination.ip field:"destination.ip" value:"0.0.0.0"
destination.ipis_null(no value, null check)excludes:destination.ip

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • connection_attempted
  • exec
field:"EventType" kind:eq
event.typeeq
  • start
field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start"
process.argseq
  • -c
  • -e
  • -r
field:"process.args" kind:eq
process.argsin
  • -e
  • -rsocket
field:"process.args" kind:in
process.command_linewildcard
  • */bin/*sh*
  • */inet/tcp/*
  • *TCPSocket.new*
  • *TCPSocket.open*
  • *connect*
  • *exec*
  • *fsockopen*
  • *import*pty*spawn*
  • *import*subprocess*call*
  • *io.popen*
  • *os.execute*
  • *socket*
  • *socket.tcp*
  • *spawn*sh*
  • *system*
field:"CommandLine" kind:wildcard
process.nameeq
  • node
field:"process_name" kind:eq value:"node"
process.namein
  • awk
  • gawk
  • mawk
  • nawk
field:"process_name" kind:in
process.namewildcard
  • *awk
  • lua*
  • node
  • perl
  • perl*
  • php*
  • python*
  • ruby
  • ruby*
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard