Detection rules › Elastic
Nohup Execution followed by Outbound Network Connection
Detects the execution of the Nohup utility pointing to a suspicious or malicious executable path followed by pushing the execution to the background using the "&". Threat actors will utilize the Nohup utility to execute their payloads in a variety of ways but specifically within initial access installer scripts and shell profile persistence. This activity should be considered highly abnormal or malicious.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects the execution of the Nohup utility pointing to a suspicious or malicious executable path followed by pushing the
execution to the background using the "&". Threat actors will utilize the Nohup utility to execute their payloads in a
variety of ways but specifically within initial access installer scripts and shell profile persistence. This activity
should be considered highly abnormal or malicious.
"""
id = "3f18726c-4897-41dc-8426-15da95b8482f"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Nohup Execution followed by Outbound Network Connection"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = ["https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x71.html"]
version = "1.0.26"
query = '''
sequence by process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=30s
[process where event.type == "start" and
process.name == "nohup" and
((process.command_line like~ ("*/tmp/*",
"*/var/tmp/*",
"*/private/var/tmp/*",
"*/var/folders/*",
"*/Users/Shared/*",
"*/Library/*",
"*/var/root/*",
"*/usr/local/bin/*",
"*/Applications/*")) or
(process.args like~ "npm" and process.args like~ "install")) and
process.parent.name like~ ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "tclsh*", "terminal", "python*", "osascript") and
not process.Ext.effective_parent.executable == "/Applications/SteelSeries GG/SteelSeries GG.app/Contents/MacOS/SteelSeries GG" and
not (process.parent.name in ("zsh", "bash", "sh") and process.parent.command_line : (
"*/.claude/shell-snapshots/*",
"*/.claude-personal/shell-snapshots/*",
"*/.codex/shell_snapshots/*",
"*/.cursor/shell-snapshots/*",
"*__CURSOR_SANDBOX_ENV_RESTORE*")) and
not process.command_line : (
"*/tmp/claude/*",
"*/private/tmp/claude/*",
"*/private/tmp/claude-*/*",
"*/Library/Application Support/Claude/local-agent-mode-sessions/*",
"*/Library/Android/sdk/emulator/*")]
[network where event.type == "start" and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
"240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15",
"192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
"192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24",
"100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
"::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1564"
name = "Hide Artifacts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1564.003"
name = "Hidden Window"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 30s, correlated by process.parent.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.type == "start" and
process.name == "nohup" and
((process.command_line like~ ("*/tmp/*",
"*/var/tmp/*",
"*/private/var/tmp/*",
"*/var/folders/*",
"*/Users/Shared/*",
"*/Library/*",
"*/var/root/*",
"*/usr/local/bin/*",
"*/Applications/*")) or
(process.args like~ "npm" and process.args like~ "install")) and
process.parent.name like~ ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "tclsh*", "terminal", "python*", "osascript") and
not process.Ext.effective_parent.executable == "/Applications/SteelSeries GG/SteelSeries GG.app/Contents/MacOS/SteelSeries GG" and
not (process.parent.name in ("zsh", "bash", "sh") and process.parent.command_line : (
"*/.claude/shell-snapshots/*",
"*/.claude-personal/shell-snapshots/*",
"*/.codex/shell_snapshots/*",
"*/.cursor/shell-snapshots/*",
"*__CURSOR_SANDBOX_ENV_RESTORE*")) and
not process.command_line : (
"*/tmp/claude/*",
"*/private/tmp/claude/*",
"*/private/tmp/claude-*/*",
"*/Library/Application Support/Claude/local-agent-mode-sessions/*",
"*/Library/Android/sdk/emulator/*")]
Stage 2: network
[network where event.type == "start" and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
"240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15",
"192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
"192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24",
"100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
"::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.command_line | match | /.claude/shell-snapshots/, /.claude-personal/shell-snapshots/, /.codex/shell_snapshots/, /.cursor/shell-snapshots/, __CURSOR_SANDBOX_ENV_RESTORE | excludes:process.parent.command_line |
process.parent.name | in | bash, sh, zsh | excludes:process.parent.name field:"process.parent.name" value:"bash" field:"process.parent.name" value:"sh" field:"process.parent.name" value:"zsh" |
process.Ext.effective_parent.executable | eq | /Applications/SteelSeries GG/SteelSeries GG.app/Contents/MacOS/SteelSeries GG | excludes:process.Ext.effective_parent.executable field:"process.Ext.effective_parent.executable" value:"/Applications/SteelSeries GG/SteelSeries GG.app/Contents/MacOS/SteelSeries GG" |
process.command_line | wildcard | */tmp/claude/*, */private/tmp/claude/*, */private/tmp/claude-*/*, */Library/Application Support/Claude/local-agent-mode-sessions/*, */Library/Android/sdk/emulator/* | excludes:process.command_line |
destination.ip | cidr_match | 240.0.0.0/4, 233.252.0.0/24, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.19.0.0/16, 192.18.0.0/15, 192.0.0.0/24, 10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.0.2.0/24, 192.31.196.0/24, 192.52.193.0/24, 192.168.0.0/16, 192.88.99.0/24, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.175.48.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, ::1, FE80::/10, FF00::/8 | excludes:destination.ip |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.args" kind:wildcard |
process.command_line | wildcard |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:wildcard |
process.name | eq |
| field:"process_name" kind:eq value:"nohup" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard |