Detection rules › Elastic

Potential Command and Control via Windows Scripts

Sequence by
process.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the execution of a Windows script interpreter followed by a network connection or DNS loookup request after 5 minutes of the process start. This may indicate long term network activity from a Windows script which is common pattern of a command and control backdoor via malicious scripts.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a Windows script interpreter followed by a network connection or DNS loookup request after 5
minutes of the process start. This may indicate long term network activity from a Windows script which is common pattern
of a command and control backdoor via malicious scripts.
"""
id = "3121956f-8c0b-40ef-b98d-7b7b0ab02d2e"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Command and Control via Windows Scripts"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.11"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id
 [process where event.action == "start" and
  process.pe.original_file_name : ("wscript.exe", "AutoIt*.exe") and
  not process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and not process.args : "\\\\*\\netlogon\\*.vbs"]
 [network where
  event.action == "connection_attempted" and network.direction == "egress" and network.transport == "tcp" and
   process.uptime >= 300 and source.port >= 49152 and
   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1",
       "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24")]
  until [process where event.action:"end"]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"

[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1573"
name = "Encrypted Channel"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order, correlated by process.entity_id.

Stage 1: process

[process where event.action == "start" and
  process.pe.original_file_name : ("wscript.exe", "AutoIt*.exe") and
  not process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and not process.args : "\\\\*\\netlogon\\*.vbs"]

Stage 2: network

[network where
  event.action == "connection_attempted" and network.direction == "egress" and network.transport == "tcp" and
   process.uptime >= 300 and source.port >= 49152 and
   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1",
       "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24")]

Until: process

until [process where event.action:"end"]

Ends the sequence: the steps above must complete before an event matching this clause occurs.

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.Ext.token.integrity_level_nameeqsystemexcludes:process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name field:"process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name" value:"system"
process.argswildcard\\*\netlogon\*.vbsexcludes:process.args field:"process.args" value:"\\*\netlogon\*.vbs"
destination.ipcidr_match10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.0.0.0/24, 192.0.0.0/29, 192.0.0.8/32, 192.0.0.9/32, 192.0.0.10/32, 192.0.0.170/32, 192.0.0.171/32, 192.0.2.0/24, 192.31.196.0/24, 192.52.193.0/24, 192.88.99.0/24, 224.0.0.0/4, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.175.48.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, 240.0.0.0/4, ::1, FE80::/10, FF00::/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.168.0.0/16, 192.88.99.0/24excludes:destination.ip

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • connection_attempted corpus 73 (elastic 73)
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq
event.actionwildcard
  • end corpus 18 (elastic 18)
field:"EventType" kind:wildcard value:"end"
network.directioneq
  • egress corpus 17 (elastic 17)
field:"Initiated" kind:eq value:"egress"
network.transporteq
  • tcp corpus 26 (elastic 25, sigma 1)
field:"Protocol" kind:eq value:"tcp"
process.pe.original_file_namewildcard
  • AutoIt*.exe corpus 8 (elastic 8)
  • wscript.exe corpus 38 (elastic 21, sigma 17)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:wildcard
process.uptimege
  • 300 transforms: number corpus 2 (elastic 2)
field:"process.uptime" kind:ge value:"300"
source.portge
  • 49152 transforms: number corpus 16 (elastic 16)
field:"SourcePort" kind:ge value:"49152"