Detection rules › Elastic

Powershell Outbound Network Connection

Time window
30s
Sequence by
process.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Detects when Powershell (pwsh) on macOS makes an outbound network connection attempt. Powershell usage on macOS is extremely rare but usage of Powershell to connect out to the internet is almost always indicative of malicious behavior.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Detects when Powershell (pwsh) on macOS makes an outbound network connection attempt. Powershell usage on macOS is
extremely rare but usage of Powershell to connect out to the internet is almost always indicative of malicious behavior.
"""
id = "53aa049c-72d1-4ddf-b089-a86059642a35"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Powershell Outbound Network Connection"
os_list = ["macos"]
version = "1.0.12"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=30s
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "pwsh"]
[network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, 
       "240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15", 
       "192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", 
       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", 
       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
       "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 1

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.001"
name = "PowerShell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 30s, correlated by process.entity_id.

Stage 1: process

[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "pwsh"]

Stage 2: network

[network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, 
       "240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15", 
       "192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", 
       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", 
       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
       "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
destination.ipcidr_match240.0.0.0/4, 233.252.0.0/24, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.19.0.0/16, 192.18.0.0/15, 192.0.0.0/24, 10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.0.2.0/24, 192.31.196.0/24, 192.52.193.0/24, 192.168.0.0/16, 192.88.99.0/24, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.175.48.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, ::1, FE80::/10, FF00::/8excludes:destination.ip

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.