Detection rules › Elastic
Python Initial Access via Google Drive
Detects the execution of Python followed by a network connection by Python to a Google Drive domain and ultimately the creation of a Python script or executable. Nation State actors have been observed engaged in several initial access campaigns using Python coding lures that retrieve and execute secondary and even tertiary Python scripts that eventually lead to a payload that establishes command and control.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Command & Control |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects the execution of Python followed by a network connection by Python to a Google Drive domain and ultimately the
creation of a Python script or executable. Nation State actors have been observed engaged in several initial access
campaigns using Python coding lures that retrieve and execute secondary and even tertiary Python scripts that eventually
lead to a payload that establishes command and control.
"""
id = "dee4badb-aa5b-477b-9bfc-708d45fee7c7"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Python Initial Access via Google Drive"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = [
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/dprk-code-of-conduct",
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-catches-dprk-passing-out-kandykorn",
]
version = "1.0.6"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=15s
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name like~ "Python*" and
not process.parent.executable == "/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/usr/bin/make"]
[network where event.type == "start" and process.name like~ "Python*" and destination.domain in ("drive.usercontent.google.com", "drive.usercontent.google.com.", "drive.google.com", "drive.google.com.", "script.google.com", "script.google.com.")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.006"
name = "Python"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1105"
name = "Ingress Tool Transfer"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 15s, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name like~ "Python*" and
not process.parent.executable == "/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/usr/bin/make"]
Stage 2: network
[network where event.type == "start" and process.name like~ "Python*" and destination.domain in ("drive.usercontent.google.com", "drive.usercontent.google.com.", "drive.google.com", "drive.google.com.", "script.google.com", "script.google.com.")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.parent.executable | eq | /Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/usr/bin/make | excludes:process.parent.executable field:"process.parent.executable" value:"/Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/usr/bin/make" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
destination.domain | in |
| field:"DestinationHostname" kind:in |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec" |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard value:"Python*" |