Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Binary Execution via SSH
Detects SSH sessions executing suspicious binaries followed by outbound network connections. This pattern indicates potential post-exploitation activity via compromised SSH access.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects SSH sessions executing suspicious binaries followed by outbound network connections. This pattern indicates
potential post-exploitation activity via compromised SSH access.
"""
id = "050a7053-a119-43fc-ad14-9a0c4944a9b8"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Binary Execution via SSH"
os_list = ["macos"]
version = "1.0.8"
query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=15s
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.parent.name in ("ssh", "sshd", "sshd-session") and
(process.name like~ ("osascript", "curl", "nscurl", "wget", "perl", "node") or (process.code_signature.exists == false or
process.code_signature.trusted == false)) and
not process.executable like~ ("/opt/homebrew/Cellar/*", "/usr/local/Cellar/*", "/Users/*/homebrew/Cellar/*", "/usr/local/libexec/ssh-sk-helper") and
not process.Ext.effective_parent.executable in ("/Applications/Codex.app/Contents/MacOS/Codex", "/Applications/Cursor.app/Contents/MacOS/Cursor") and
process.hash.sha256 != "cc2b7231c9f1696e24c0c05cbc93ec88172ba6fa102b0fbbdc8ed95ee564b4d6"
]
[network where event.type == "start" and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
"240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15",
"192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
"192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24",
"100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
"::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 15s, correlated by process.entity_id.
Stage 1: process
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.parent.name in ("ssh", "sshd", "sshd-session") and
(process.name like~ ("osascript", "curl", "nscurl", "wget", "perl", "node") or (process.code_signature.exists == false or
process.code_signature.trusted == false)) and
not process.executable like~ ("/opt/homebrew/Cellar/*", "/usr/local/Cellar/*", "/Users/*/homebrew/Cellar/*", "/usr/local/libexec/ssh-sk-helper") and
not process.Ext.effective_parent.executable in ("/Applications/Codex.app/Contents/MacOS/Codex", "/Applications/Cursor.app/Contents/MacOS/Cursor") and
process.hash.sha256 != "cc2b7231c9f1696e24c0c05cbc93ec88172ba6fa102b0fbbdc8ed95ee564b4d6"
]
Stage 2: network
[network where event.type == "start" and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip,
"240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15",
"192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
"192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24",
"100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
"::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.Ext.effective_parent.executable | in | /Applications/Codex.app/Contents/MacOS/Codex, /Applications/Cursor.app/Contents/MacOS/Cursor | excludes:process.Ext.effective_parent.executable field:"process.Ext.effective_parent.executable" value:"/Applications/Codex.app/Contents/MacOS/Codex" field:"process.Ext.effective_parent.executable" value:"/Applications/Cursor.app/Contents/MacOS/Cursor" |
process.executable | wildcard | /opt/homebrew/Cellar/*, /usr/local/Cellar/*, /Users/*/homebrew/Cellar/*, /usr/local/libexec/ssh-sk-helper | excludes:process.executable |
destination.ip | cidr_match | 240.0.0.0/4, 233.252.0.0/24, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.19.0.0/16, 192.18.0.0/15, 192.0.0.0/24, 10.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.0.2.0/24, 192.31.196.0/24, 192.52.193.0/24, 192.168.0.0/16, 192.88.99.0/24, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.175.48.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24, ::1, FE80::/10, FF00::/8 | excludes:destination.ip |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec" |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.code_signature.exists | eq |
| field:"process.code_signature.exists" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq |
| field:"process.code_signature.trusted" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.hash.sha256 | ne |
| field:"Hashes" kind:ne value:"cc2b7231c9f1696e24c0c05cbc93ec88172ba6fa102b0fbbdc8ed95ee564b4d6" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.name | in |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:in |