Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Installer Remote Plugin Service Child Process
Detects when the macOS installer application remote plugin service invokes a suspicious process. This activity is highly suspicious and could indicate a malicious installer package attempting to gain initial access via XPC.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects when the macOS installer application remote plugin service invokes a suspicious process. This activity is highly
suspicious and could indicate a malicious installer package attempting to gain initial access via XPC.
"""
id = "a67b556a-daa0-46c6-ba11-d03336442337"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Installer Remote Plugin Service Child Process"
os_list = ["macos"]
version = "1.0.19"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
(process.parent.executable like "/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app/Contents/XPCServices/InstallerRemotePluginService*" or
process.Ext.effective_parent.executable like "/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app/Contents/XPCServices/InstallerRemotePluginService*") and
process.name like~ ("tclsh", "python*", "osascript", "curl", "nscurl") and
not process.args like~ ("open*", "rm*", "touch*")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.5.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1559"
name = "Inter-Process Communication"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1559.003"
name = "XPC Services"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/003/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.5.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
(process.parent.executable like "/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app/Contents/XPCServices/InstallerRemotePluginService*" or
process.Ext.effective_parent.executable like "/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app/Contents/XPCServices/InstallerRemotePluginService*") and
process.name like~ ("tclsh", "python*", "osascript", "curl", "nscurl") and
not process.args like~ ("open*", "rm*", "touch*")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.args | starts_with | open, rm, touch | excludes:process.args field:"process.args" value:"open" field:"process.args" value:"rm" field:"process.args" value:"touch" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec" |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.Ext.effective_parent.executable | wildcard |
| field:"process.Ext.effective_parent.executable" kind:wildcard value:"/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app/Contents/XPCServices/InstallerRemotePluginService*" |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.executable | wildcard |
| field:"ParentImage" kind:wildcard value:"/System/Library/CoreServices/Installer.app/Contents/XPCServices/InstallerRemotePluginService*" |