Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Large Script Execution via Shell Command
Detects when a script interpreter or unsigned/untrusted binary executes an abnormally large shell command. Many different types of macOS malware will hardcode large shell or apple scripts and execute them via a shell command.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Detects when a script interpreter or unsigned/untrusted binary executes an abnormally large shell command. Many
different types of macOS malware will hardcode large shell or apple scripts and execute them via a shell command.
"""
id = "2410cd1c-4f14-4db3-be70-16e86a37c9a9"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Large Script Execution via Shell Command"
os_list = ["macos"]
reference = [
"https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/xcsset-malware-update-macos-threat-actors-prepare-for-life-without-python/",
]
version = "1.0.3"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (process.name in ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "dash", "csh", "tcsh", "ksh", "tclsh", "fish") or process.name like "tclsh*") and process.args == "-c" and process.command_line == null and process.args_count <= 4 and
(process.parent.name like~ ("osascript", "python*", "node", "sh", "bash", "zsh", "dash", "csh", "tcsh", "ksh", "fish", "tclsh*") or (process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or process.parent.code_signature.exists == false))
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.002"
name = "AppleScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.11.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and (process.name in ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "dash", "csh", "tcsh", "ksh", "tclsh", "fish") or process.name like "tclsh*") and process.args == "-c" and process.command_line == null and process.args_count <= 4 and
(process.parent.name like~ ("osascript", "python*", "node", "sh", "bash", "zsh", "dash", "csh", "tcsh", "ksh", "fish", "tclsh*") or (process.parent.code_signature.trusted == false or process.parent.code_signature.exists == false))
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"exec" |
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.args | eq |
| field:"process.args" kind:eq value:"-c" |
process.args_count | le |
| field:"process.args_count" kind:le value:"4" |
process.command_line | is_null | field:"CommandLine" kind:is_null | |
process.name | in |
| field:"process_name" kind:in |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard value:"tclsh*" |
process.parent.code_signature.exists | eq |
| field:"process.parent.code_signature.exists" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.parent.code_signature.trusted | eq |
| field:"process.parent.code_signature.trusted" kind:eq value:"false" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard |