Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Script Execution via VBSEdit Launcher
Identifies the execution of a Script via VbsEdit Script Launcher utility and from unusual path. Malware may abuse this legit utility to bypass security solutions monitoring malicious scripts execution via the Windows built-in Script interpreters (cscript or wscript).
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a Script via VbsEdit Script Launcher utility and from unusual path. Malware may abuse this
legit utility to bypass security solutions monitoring malicious scripts execution via the Windows built-in Script
interpreters (cscript or wscript).
"""
id = "d4715380-5857-4062-980d-c44052ff5180"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Script Execution via VBSEdit Launcher"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.vbsedit.com/", "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.vjw0rm"]
version = "1.0.25"
query = '''
process where event.type == "start" and
(process.pe.original_file_name == "launcher.exe" and process.code_signature.subject_name : "Adersoft") and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe") and
not user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
not process.executable : "?:\\RANOCCHI\\GiDesk\\Gis\\System\\Rtf\\Doc\\RCbase64.exe"
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.005"
name = "Visual Basic"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.type == "start" and
(process.pe.original_file_name == "launcher.exe" and process.code_signature.subject_name : "Adersoft") and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe") and
not user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
not process.executable : "?:\\RANOCCHI\\GiDesk\\Gis\\System\\Rtf\\Doc\\RCbase64.exe"
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | eq | ?:\RANOCCHI\GiDesk\Gis\System\Rtf\Doc\RCbase64.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\RANOCCHI\GiDesk\Gis\System\Rtf\Doc\RCbase64.exe" |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files\*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe" |
user.id | in | S-1-5-18, S-1-5-19, S-1-5-20 | excludes:user.id field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-18" field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-19" field:"user.id" value:"S-1-5-20" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.type | eq |
| field:"event.type" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.code_signature.subject_name | wildcard |
| field:"Signature" kind:wildcard value:"Adersoft" |
process.pe.original_file_name | eq |
| field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq value:"launcher.exe" |