Detection rules › Elastic

Windows Script Execution from Archive File

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the execution of a Windows script from an archive file, mounted ISO or IMG path. Adversaries may use this technique to deliver malicious scripts.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a Windows script from an archive file, mounted ISO or IMG path. Adversaries may use this
technique to deliver malicious scripts.
"""
id = "816e1e39-e1a3-4935-9b7b-18395d244670"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Windows Script Execution from Archive File"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.30"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
 user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and process.name : "wscript.exe" and
 (
   /* execution from archive temp file */
   process.args : ("?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\7z*", "?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\Rar$*", "?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\Temp?_*") or

  /* execution from mounted ISO or IMG  */
   (process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and process.working_directory : "?:\\" and
    not process.args : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\winrm.vbs" and not process.working_directory : "C:\\")
  ) and
  not (process.name : "cscript.exe" and process.command_line : "cscript  C:\\splitwindow.vbs" and
      process.parent.args : "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*.bat") and
  not (process.args : "?:\\Program Files\\nodejs" and process.args : "rmdir" and process.name : "wscript.exe") and
  not process.command_line :
              ("\"wscript.exe\" pbcdstart.vbs",
               "cscript  C:\\splitwindow.vbs",
               "\"C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WScript.exe\" \"D:\\CargaExpedientesProd.vbs\" ")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and
 user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and process.name : "wscript.exe" and
 (
   process.args : ("?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\7z*", "?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\Rar$*", "?:\\Users\\*\\Temp\\Temp?_*") or
   (process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and process.working_directory : "?:\\" and
    not process.args : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\winrm.vbs" and not process.working_directory : "C:\\")
  ) and
  not (process.name : "cscript.exe" and process.command_line : "cscript  C:\\splitwindow.vbs" and
      process.parent.args : "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*.bat") and
  not (process.args : "?:\\Program Files\\nodejs" and process.args : "rmdir" and process.name : "wscript.exe") and
  not process.command_line :
              ("\"wscript.exe\" pbcdstart.vbs",
               "cscript  C:\\splitwindow.vbs",
               "\"C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WScript.exe\" \"D:\\CargaExpedientesProd.vbs\" ")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.argseq?:\Program Files\nodejsexcludes:process.args field:"process.args" value:"?:\Program Files\nodejs"
process.argseqrmdirexcludes:process.args field:"process.args" value:"rmdir"
process.nameeqwscript.exeexcludes:process.name field:"process.name" value:"wscript.exe"
process.command_lineeqcscript C:\splitwindow.vbsexcludes:process.command_line field:"process.command_line" value:"cscript C:\splitwindow.vbs"
process.nameeqcscript.exeexcludes:process.name field:"process.name" value:"cscript.exe"
process.parent.argswildcardC:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.batexcludes:process.parent.args field:"process.parent.args" value:"C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.bat"
process.command_lineeq"wscript.exe" pbcdstart.vbs, cscript C:\splitwindow.vbs, "C:\WINDOWS\System32\WScript.exe" "D:\CargaExpedientesProd.vbs" excludes:process.command_line

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
process.argswildcard
  • ?:\Users\*\Temp\7z* corpus 4 (elastic 4)
  • ?:\Users\*\Temp\Rar$* corpus 4 (elastic 4)
  • ?:\Users\*\Temp\Temp?_* corpus 4 (elastic 4)
field:"process.args" kind:wildcard
process.namewildcard
  • wscript.exe corpus 83 (elastic 82, splunk 1)
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard value:"wscript.exe"
process.parent.namewildcard
  • cmd.exe corpus 36 (elastic 31, splunk 4, kusto 1)
  • explorer.exe corpus 51 (elastic 50, splunk 1)
  • powershell.exe corpus 39 (elastic 36, kusto 2, splunk 1)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard
process.working_directorywildcard
  • ?:\ corpus 8 (elastic 8)
field:"CurrentDirectory" kind:wildcard value:"?:\"
user.idwildcard
  • S-1-12-* corpus 46 (elastic 46)
  • S-1-5-21* corpus 47 (elastic 47)
field:"user.id" kind:wildcard