Detection rules › Elastic

Windows Shortcut File Embedded Object Execution

Time window
1m
Sequence by
process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the execution of a script or program extracted from within a Windows shortcut (lnk) file. Adversaries may embed malicious scripts or files in a shortcut file before delivering it to their target in order to trick them into executing the payload.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a script or program extracted from within a Windows shortcut (lnk) file. Adversaries may
embed malicious scripts or files in a shortcut file before delivering it to their target in order to trick them into
executing the payload.
"""
id = "8076640d-ec66-4d24-a252-ee2f054e00a1"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Windows Shortcut File Embedded Object Execution"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/13SsBd0wI0PpyH5C8WlnE_DsJjy1KxAjZ5Dmke9FHfRE/"]
version = "1.0.31"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=60s
  [process where event.action == "start" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
   process.command_line :
         ("*find*.*.lnk*>*&*",
          "*.lnk*find*>*&*",
          "*dir*/s*/b*.lnk*",
          "*dir*.lnk*/s*/b*",
          "*for*/f*in*.lnk*",
          "*LoadFromFile*.lnk*>*&*",
          "*.lnk*do type*",
          "*/s*/d*type*.lnk*",
          "*.doc.lnk*",
          "*.pdf.lnk*")
   ] by process.entity_id
  [file where event.action != "deletion" and process.name : "cmd.exe"] by process.entity_id
  [process where event.action == "start" and
   not process.executable : 
           ("?:\\Windows\\system32\\attrib.exe", 
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\attrib.exe", 
            "?:\\Windows\\system32\\find.exe", 
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\find.exe",
            "?:\\Windows\\system32\\findstr.exe",
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\findstr.exe",
            "?:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe", 
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\conhost.exe") and
   not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and
          process.command_line :
                 ("*find*.*.lnk*>*",
                  "*.lnk*find*>*",
                  "*dir*/s*/b*.lnk*",
                  "*dir*.lnk*/s*/b*",
                  "*for*/f*in*.lnk*",
                  "*LoadFromFile*.lnk*",
                  "*.lnk*do type*",
                  "*/s*/d*type*.lnk*",
                  "*.doc.lnk*",
                  "*.pdf.lnk*"))
   ] by process.parent.entity_id
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 2

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.002"
name = "Spearphishing Link"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.003"
name = "Windows Command Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/"


[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1204"
name = "User Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1204.001"
name = "Malicious Link"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/001/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1204.002"
name = "Malicious File"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id.

Stage 1: process

[process where event.action == "start" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
   process.command_line :
         ("*find*.*.lnk*>*&*",
          "*.lnk*find*>*&*",
          "*dir*/s*/b*.lnk*",
          "*dir*.lnk*/s*/b*",
          "*for*/f*in*.lnk*",
          "*LoadFromFile*.lnk*>*&*",
          "*.lnk*do type*",
          "*/s*/d*type*.lnk*",
          "*.doc.lnk*",
          "*.pdf.lnk*")
   ] by process.entity_id

Stage 2: file

[file where event.action != "deletion" and process.name : "cmd.exe"] by process.entity_id

Stage 3: process

[process where event.action == "start" and
   not process.executable : 
           ("?:\\Windows\\system32\\attrib.exe", 
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\attrib.exe", 
            "?:\\Windows\\system32\\find.exe", 
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\find.exe",
            "?:\\Windows\\system32\\findstr.exe",
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\findstr.exe",
            "?:\\Windows\\system32\\conhost.exe", 
            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\conhost.exe") and
   not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and
          process.command_line :
                 ("*find*.*.lnk*>*",
                  "*.lnk*find*>*",
                  "*dir*/s*/b*.lnk*",
                  "*dir*.lnk*/s*/b*",
                  "*for*/f*in*.lnk*",
                  "*LoadFromFile*.lnk*",
                  "*.lnk*do type*",
                  "*/s*/d*type*.lnk*",
                  "*.doc.lnk*",
                  "*.pdf.lnk*"))
   ] by process.parent.entity_id

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.command_linewildcard*find*.*.lnk*>*, *.lnk*find*>*, *dir*/s*/b*.lnk*, *dir*.lnk*/s*/b*, *for*/f*in*.lnk*, *LoadFromFile*.lnk*, *.lnk*do type*, */s*/d*type*.lnk*, *.doc.lnk*, *.pdf.lnk*excludes:process.command_line
process.nameeqcmd.exeexcludes:process.name field:"process.name" value:"cmd.exe"
process.executableeq?:\Windows\system32\attrib.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\attrib.exe, ?:\Windows\system32\find.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\find.exe, ?:\Windows\system32\findstr.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\findstr.exe, ?:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\conhost.exeexcludes:process.executable

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
event.actionne
  • deletion corpus 86 (elastic 86)
field:"EventType" kind:ne value:"deletion"
process.command_linewildcard
  • *.doc.lnk*
  • *.lnk*do type*
  • *.lnk*find*>*&*
  • *.pdf.lnk*
  • */s*/d*type*.lnk*
  • *LoadFromFile*.lnk*>*&*
  • *dir*.lnk*/s*/b*
  • *dir*/s*/b*.lnk*
  • *find*.*.lnk*>*&*
  • *for*/f*in*.lnk*
field:"CommandLine" kind:wildcard
process.namewildcard
  • cmd.exe corpus 121 (elastic 92, splunk 29)
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard value:"cmd.exe"