Detection rules › Elastic

Potential Ransomware Note File via SMB

Time window
3s
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies an incoming SMB connection followed by the creation of a file with a name similar to ransomware note files. This may indicate a remote ransomware attack via the SMB protocol.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Impact

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies an incoming SMB connection followed by the creation of a file with a name similar to ransomware note files.
This may indicate a remote ransomware attack via the SMB protocol.
"""
id = "47356607-cb03-476d-b722-5199246904fe"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Ransomware Note File via SMB"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.7"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=3s
 [network where event.action == "connection_accepted" and destination.port == 445 and source.port >= 49152 and
  process.pid == 4 and network.type == "ipv4" and not endswith(source.address, destination.address) and
  source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" ]
 [file where event.action == "creation" and process.pid == 4 and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
   file.extension : ("hta", "txt", "readme", "htm*") and file.path : "C:\\Users\\*" and
    /* ransom file name keywords */
    file.name : ("*read*me*", "*lock*", "*@*", "*RECOVER*", "*decrypt*", "*restore*file*", "*FILES_BACK*", "*how*to*") and
    not file.name : "*:Zone.Identifier"]
 [file where event.action == "creation" and process.pid == 4 and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
   file.extension : ("hta", "txt", "readme", "htm*") and file.path : "C:\\Users\\*" and
    /* ransom file name keywords */
    file.name : ("*read*me*", "*lock*", "*@*", "*RECOVER*", "*decrypt*", "*restore*file*", "*FILES_BACK*", "*how*to*") and
    not file.name : "*:Zone.Identifier"]
'''

actions = []
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1485"
name = "Data Destruction"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0040"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: network

[network where event.action == "connection_accepted" and destination.port == 445 and source.port >= 49152 and
  process.pid == 4 and network.type == "ipv4" and not endswith(source.address, destination.address) and
  source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" ]

Stage 2: file

[file where event.action == "creation" and process.pid == 4 and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
   file.extension : ("hta", "txt", "readme", "htm*") and file.path : "C:\\Users\\*" and
    file.name : ("*read*me*", "*lock*", "*@*", "*RECOVER*", "*decrypt*", "*restore*file*", "*FILES_BACK*", "*how*to*") and
    not file.name : "*:Zone.Identifier"]

Stage 3: file

[file where event.action == "creation" and process.pid == 4 and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
   file.extension : ("hta", "txt", "readme", "htm*") and file.path : "C:\\Users\\*" and
    file.name : ("*read*me*", "*lock*", "*@*", "*RECOVER*", "*decrypt*", "*restore*file*", "*FILES_BACK*", "*how*to*") and
    not file.name : "*:Zone.Identifier"]

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
source.addressends_withdestination.addressexcludes:source.address field:"source.address" value:"destination.address"
file.nameends_with:Zone.Identifierexcludes:file.name field:"file.name" value:":Zone.Identifier"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
destination.porteq
  • 445 transforms: number corpus 10 (elastic 7, splunk 2, sigma 1)
field:"DestinationPort" kind:eq value:"445"
event.actioneq
  • connection_accepted corpus 6 (elastic 6)
  • creation corpus 58 (elastic 58)
field:"EventType" kind:eq
file.extensionwildcard
  • hta corpus 20 (elastic 20)
  • htm*
  • readme
  • txt corpus 4 (elastic 4)
field:"file.extension" kind:wildcard
file.namewildcard
  • *@*
  • *FILES_BACK*
  • *RECOVER*
  • *decrypt*
  • *how*to* corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • *lock*
  • *read*me* corpus 3 (elastic 3)
  • *restore*file* corpus 3 (elastic 3)
field:"file.name" kind:wildcard
file.pathwildcard
  • C:\Users\* corpus 13 (sigma 9, elastic 4)
field:"TargetFilename" kind:wildcard value:"C:\Users\*"
network.typeeq
  • ipv4 corpus 3 (elastic 3)
field:"network.type" kind:eq value:"ipv4"
process.pideq
  • 4 transforms: number corpus 19 (elastic 19)
field:"process_id" kind:eq value:"4"
source.ipne
  • 127.0.0.1 corpus 23 (elastic 22, splunk 1)
  • ::1 corpus 21 (elastic 20, splunk 1)
field:"src_ip" kind:ne
source.portge
  • 49152 transforms: number corpus 16 (elastic 16)
field:"SourcePort" kind:ge value:"49152"
user.idwildcard
  • S-1-12-* corpus 46 (elastic 46)
  • S-1-5-21* corpus 47 (elastic 47)
field:"user.id" kind:wildcard