Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious File Rename via SMB
Identifies an incoming SMB connection followed by a suspicious file rename operation. This may indicate a remote ransomware attack via the SMB protocol.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Impact |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies an incoming SMB connection followed by a suspicious file rename operation. This may indicate a remote
ransomware attack via the SMB protocol.
"""
id = "58b7beb4-0b8a-4196-a17d-7317620ef495"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious File Rename via SMB"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.6"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=3s
[network where event.action == "connection_accepted" and destination.port == 445 and source.port >= 49152 and
process.pid == 4 and network.type == "ipv4" and not endswith(source.address, destination.address) and
source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" ]
[file where event.action == "rename" and process.pid == 4 and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
file.extension != null and file.Ext.entropy >= 6 and file.path : "C:\\Users\\*" and
file.Ext.original.name : ("*.jpg", "*.bmp", "*.png", "*.pdf", "*.doc", "*.docx", "*.xls", "*.xlsx", "*.ppt", "*.pptx", "*.lnk", "*.txt") and
not file.extension in~ ("jpg", "bmp", "png", "pdf", "doc", "docx", "xls", "xlsx", "ppt", "pptx", "lnk", "txt")]
[file where event.action == "rename" and process.pid == 4 and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
file.extension != null and file.Ext.entropy >= 6 and file.path : "C:\\Users\\*" and
file.Ext.original.name : ("*.jpg", "*.bmp", "*.png", "*.pdf", "*.doc", "*.docx", "*.xls", "*.xlsx", "*.ppt", "*.pptx", "*.lnk", "*.txt") and
not file.extension in~ ("jpg", "bmp", "png", "pdf", "doc", "docx", "xls", "xlsx", "ppt", "pptx", "lnk", "txt")]
'''
actions = []
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1486"
name = "Data Encrypted for Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1490"
name = "Inhibit System Recovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0040"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: network
[network where event.action == "connection_accepted" and destination.port == 445 and source.port >= 49152 and
process.pid == 4 and network.type == "ipv4" and not endswith(source.address, destination.address) and
source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" ]
Stage 2: file
[file where event.action == "rename" and process.pid == 4 and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
file.extension != null and file.Ext.entropy >= 6 and file.path : "C:\\Users\\*" and
file.Ext.original.name : ("*.jpg", "*.bmp", "*.png", "*.pdf", "*.doc", "*.docx", "*.xls", "*.xlsx", "*.ppt", "*.pptx", "*.lnk", "*.txt") and
not file.extension in~ ("jpg", "bmp", "png", "pdf", "doc", "docx", "xls", "xlsx", "ppt", "pptx", "lnk", "txt")]
Stage 3: file
[file where event.action == "rename" and process.pid == 4 and user.id like ("S-1-5-21*", "S-1-12-*") and
file.extension != null and file.Ext.entropy >= 6 and file.path : "C:\\Users\\*" and
file.Ext.original.name : ("*.jpg", "*.bmp", "*.png", "*.pdf", "*.doc", "*.docx", "*.xls", "*.xlsx", "*.ppt", "*.pptx", "*.lnk", "*.txt") and
not file.extension in~ ("jpg", "bmp", "png", "pdf", "doc", "docx", "xls", "xlsx", "ppt", "pptx", "lnk", "txt")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
source.address | ends_with | destination.address | excludes:source.address field:"source.address" value:"destination.address" |
file.extension | in | bmp, doc, docx, jpg, lnk, pdf, png, ppt, pptx, txt, xls, xlsx | excludes:file.extension |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
destination.port | eq |
| field:"DestinationPort" kind:eq value:"445" |
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq |
file.Ext.entropy | ge |
| field:"file.Ext.entropy" kind:ge value:"6" |
file.Ext.original.name | wildcard |
| field:"file.Ext.original.name" kind:wildcard |
file.extension | is_not_null | field:"file.extension" kind:is_not_null | |
file.path | wildcard |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:wildcard value:"C:\Users\*" |
network.type | eq |
| field:"network.type" kind:eq value:"ipv4" |
process.pid | eq |
| field:"process_id" kind:eq value:"4" |
source.ip | ne |
| field:"src_ip" kind:ne |
source.port | ge |
| field:"SourcePort" kind:ge value:"49152" |
user.id | wildcard |
| field:"user.id" kind:wildcard |