Detection rules › Elastic

Execution from a Remote Working Directory

Time window
1m
Sequence by
process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the execution of a Micorosft signed binary from a remote working directory followed by spawning a file hosted on a remote share. This may indicate the successful execution of a remote file via malicious files such as shortcuts.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a Micorosft signed binary from a remote working directory followed by spawning a file hosted
on a remote share. This may indicate the successful execution of a remote file via malicious files such as shortcuts.
"""
id = "fc2debc9-b8ad-45e3-b95a-b18ada0350b0"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Execution from a Remote Working Directory"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/stealth-falcon-zero-day/",
    "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2025-33053",
]
version = "1.0.3"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=1m
[process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "7zFM.exe", "WinRAR.exe", "Bandizip.exe", "7zG.exe") and
 process.working_directory : "\\\\*" and process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Microsoft Windows", "Microsoft Corporation") and
 not process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "winword.exe", "devenv.exe")] by process.entity_id
[process where event.action == "start" and process.executable : "\\Device\\Mup*"] by process.parent.entity_id
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1203"
name = "Exploitation for Client Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by process.entity_id, process.parent.entity_id.

Stage 1: process

[process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "7zFM.exe", "WinRAR.exe", "Bandizip.exe", "7zG.exe") and
 process.working_directory : "\\\\*" and process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Microsoft Windows", "Microsoft Corporation") and
 not process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "winword.exe", "devenv.exe")] by process.entity_id

Stage 2: process

[process where event.action == "start" and process.executable : "\\Device\\Mup*"] by process.parent.entity_id

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.nameeqcmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, excel.exe, outlook.exe, winword.exe, devenv.exeexcludes:process.name

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
process.code_signature.subject_namein
  • Microsoft Corporation corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • Microsoft Windows corpus 3 (elastic 3)
field:"Signature" kind:in
process.executablewildcard
  • \Device\Mup* corpus 4 (elastic 4)
field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"\Device\Mup*"
process.parent.namewildcard
  • 7zFM.exe corpus 12 (elastic 12)
  • 7zG.exe corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • Bandizip.exe corpus 5 (elastic 5)
  • WinRAR.exe corpus 15 (elastic 14, splunk 1)
  • explorer.exe corpus 51 (elastic 50, splunk 1)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard
process.working_directorywildcard
  • \\* corpus 2 (elastic 2)
field:"CurrentDirectory" kind:wildcard value:"\\*"