Detection rules › Elastic

Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office

Time window
2m
Sequence by
file.path, process.executable
Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies when a Microsoft Office process creates a portable executable (PE) file and the file is subsequently executed. An adversary may deliver a weaponized Office document to their target that writes and executes a malicious PE file.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies when a Microsoft Office process creates a portable executable (PE) file and the file is subsequently
executed. An adversary may deliver a weaponized Office document to their target that writes and executes a malicious PE
file.
"""
id = "901f0c30-a7c5-40c5-80e3-a50c6744632f"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.31"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=2m
  [ file where event.action != "deletion" and
      process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
      // Match Windows PE files by header data (MZ)
      file.Ext.header_bytes : "4d5a*" and
      not file.extension : ("exe", "com") ] by file.path
  [ process where event.action == "start" ] by process.executable
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.002"
name = "Spearphishing Link"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 2m, correlated by file.path, process.executable.

Stage 1: file

[ file where event.action != "deletion" and
      process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE") and
      file.Ext.header_bytes : "4d5a*" and
      not file.extension : ("exe", "com") ] by file.path

Stage 2: process

[ process where event.action == "start" ] by process.executable

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
event.actionne
  • deletion corpus 86 (elastic 86)
field:"EventType" kind:ne value:"deletion"
file.Ext.header_byteswildcard
  • 4d5a* corpus 46 (elastic 46)
field:"file.Ext.header_bytes" kind:wildcard value:"4d5a*"
process.namewildcard
  • EXCEL.EXE corpus 34 (elastic 34)
  • MSACCESS.EXE corpus 19 (elastic 19)
  • POWERPNT.EXE corpus 31 (elastic 31)
  • WINWORD.EXE corpus 35 (elastic 35)
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard