Detection rules › Elastic
Microsoft Equation Editor Child Process
Identifies suspicious child processes of the Microsoft Equation Editor process, which is frequently targeted by attackers using weaponized Microsoft Office documents. These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications via known vulnerabilities CVE-2017-1182 or CVE-2018-0798.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Execution |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies suspicious child processes of the Microsoft Equation Editor process, which is frequently targeted by
attackers using weaponized Microsoft Office documents. These child processes are often launched during exploitation of
Office applications via known vulnerabilities CVE-2017-1182 or CVE-2018-0798.
"""
id = "60eb5960-b26e-494a-8cf2-35ab5939f6c1"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Microsoft Equation Editor Child Process"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://www.anomali.com/blog/multiple-chinese-threat-groups-exploiting-cve-2018-0798-equation-editor-vulnerability-since-late-2018",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0798",
]
version = "1.0.31"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "EQNEDT32.EXE" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1203"
name = "Exploitation for Client Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "EQNEDT32.EXE" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | eq | ?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"EQNEDT32.EXE" |