Detection rules › Elastic

Microsoft Equation Editor Child Process

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies suspicious child processes of the Microsoft Equation Editor process, which is frequently targeted by attackers using weaponized Microsoft Office documents. These child processes are often launched during exploitation of Office applications via known vulnerabilities CVE-2017-1182 or CVE-2018-0798.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies suspicious child processes of the Microsoft Equation Editor process, which is frequently targeted by
attackers using weaponized Microsoft Office documents. These child processes are often launched during exploitation of
Office applications via known vulnerabilities CVE-2017-1182 or CVE-2018-0798.
"""
id = "60eb5960-b26e-494a-8cf2-35ab5939f6c1"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Microsoft Equation Editor Child Process"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://www.anomali.com/blog/multiple-chinese-threat-groups-exploiting-cve-2018-0798-equation-editor-vulnerability-since-late-2018",
    "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882",
    "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0798",
]
version = "1.0.31"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "EQNEDT32.EXE" and
  not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1203"
name = "Exploitation for Client Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "EQNEDT32.EXE" and
  not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.executableeq?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeexcludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
process.parent.namewildcard
  • EQNEDT32.EXE corpus 9 (elastic 9)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"EQNEDT32.EXE"