Detection rules › Elastic
Microsoft Office File Execution via Script Interpreter
Identifies the execution of an executable file written or modified by Microsoft Office processes and via a Windows Shell process.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of an executable file written or modified by Microsoft Office processes and via a Windows Shell
process.
"""
id = "54aabea0-3687-4ef1-b70c-015ca588e563"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Microsoft Office File Execution via Script Interpreter"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.32"
query = '''
sequence by user.id with maxspan=1m
[file where event.action != "deletion" and
(file.extension : ("exe", "com", "pif", "scr") or
// Match Windows PE files by header data (MZ)
file.Ext.header_bytes : "4d5a*") and
process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE")] by file.path
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe") and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe")] by process.executable
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Ordered sequence: each step below must occur in order within 1m, correlated by file.path, process.executable, user.id.
Stage 1: file
[file where event.action != "deletion" and
(file.extension : ("exe", "com", "pif", "scr") or
file.Ext.header_bytes : "4d5a*") and
process.name : ("WINWORD.EXE", "EXCEL.EXE", "POWERPNT.EXE", "MSACCESS.EXE")] by file.path
Stage 2: process
[process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe") and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe")] by process.executable
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files\*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
event.action | ne |
| field:"EventType" kind:ne value:"deletion" |
file.Ext.header_bytes | wildcard |
| field:"file.Ext.header_bytes" kind:wildcard value:"4d5a*" |
file.extension | wildcard |
| field:"file.extension" kind:wildcard |
process.name | wildcard |
| field:"process_name" kind:wildcard |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard |