Detection rules › Elastic
Potential Execution via Foxmail Exploitation
Identifies the Foxmail client process spawning a child process with argument pointing to the Foxmail temp directory. This may indicate the successful exploitation of a Foxmail vulnerability for initial access and execution via a malicious email that automatically double clicks a hidden executable attachment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Execution |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the Foxmail client process spawning a child process with argument pointing to the Foxmail temp directory.
This may indicate the successful exploitation of a Foxmail vulnerability for initial access and execution via a
malicious email that automatically double clicks a hidden executable attachment.
"""
id = "0f00dd3b-3a41-45d3-afb6-cdf874f28d8c"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Execution via Foxmail Exploitation"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/F8hNyESBdKhwXkQPgtGpew"]
version = "1.0.3"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "Foxmail.exe" and process.args : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Foxmail*" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe") and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd.", "Tencent Technology(Shenzhen) Company Limited") and
process.code_signature.trusted == true)
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
tree = true
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1189"
name = "Drive-by Compromise"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1203"
name = "Exploitation for Client Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : "Foxmail.exe" and process.args : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Foxmail*" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe") and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name in ("Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd.", "Tencent Technology(Shenzhen) Company Limited") and
process.code_signature.trusted == true)
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.code_signature.subject_name | in | Tencent Technology(Shenzhen) Company Limited, Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd. | excludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Tencent Technology(Shenzhen) Company Limited" field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd." |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files\*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.args | wildcard |
| field:"process.args" kind:wildcard value:"?:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Foxmail*" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"Foxmail.exe" |