Detection rules › Elastic
Potential Microsoft Outlook Remote Code Execution
Identifies when Microsoft Outlook registers a new COM object followed by loading the configured module. This behavior is consistent with the successful exploitation of CVE-2024-21378 (a remote code execution in Microsoft Outlook).
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Execution |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies when Microsoft Outlook registers a new COM object followed by loading the configured module. This behavior is
consistent with the successful exploitation of CVE-2024-21378 (a remote code execution in Microsoft Outlook).
"""
id = "27203f2c-7959-4195-bba1-9f2bdbf75ffa"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Microsoft Outlook Remote Code Execution"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
"https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/red-team-operations/microsoft-outlook-remote-code-execution-cve-2024-21378/",
]
version = "1.0.4"
query = '''
sequence with maxspan=3m
[registry where event.action == "modification" and process.name : "outlook.exe" and
registry.data.strings != null and registry.path : "HKEY_USERS\\*_Classes\\CLSID\\*"] as event0
[library where event.action == "load" and process.name : "outlook.exe" and
dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <= 900 and
(dll.code_signature.exists == false or dll.code_signature.trusted == false) and
stringcontains~(event0.registry.data.strings, dll.name) and
not dll.path :
("?:\\Windows\\assembly\\NativeImages*",
"?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\apppatch\\*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*")]
'''
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1203"
name = "Exploitation for Client Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: registry
[registry where event.action == "modification" and process.name : "outlook.exe" and
registry.data.strings != null and registry.path : "HKEY_USERS\\*_Classes\\CLSID\\*"] as event0
Stage 2: library
[library where event.action == "load" and process.name : "outlook.exe" and
dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <= 900 and
(dll.code_signature.exists == false or dll.code_signature.trusted == false) and
stringcontains~(event0.registry.data.strings, dll.name) and
not dll.path :
("?:\\Windows\\assembly\\NativeImages*",
"?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*",
"?:\\Windows\\apppatch\\*",
"?:\\Program Files\\*",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*")]
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
dll.path | starts_with | ?:\Windows\assembly\NativeImages, ?:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\, ?:\Windows\WinSxS\, ?:\Windows\System32\, ?:\Windows\SysWOW64\, ?:\Windows\apppatch\, ?:\Program Files\, ?:\Program Files (x86)\ | excludes:dll.path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.