Detection rules › Elastic

Potential WebShell via ScreenConnect Server

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the ScreenConnect server process (ScreenConnect.Service.exe). This activity may indicate exploitation activity or access to an existing web shell backdoor.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies suspicious processes being spawned by the ScreenConnect server process (ScreenConnect.Service.exe). This
activity may indicate exploitation activity or access to an existing web shell backdoor.
"""
id = "10265eab-b3b0-4ecb-bed2-5b4f4a5a4e28"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential WebShell via ScreenConnect Server"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.2"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
  process.parent.name : "ScreenConnect.Service.exe" and
  process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "csc.exe") and
  not process.executable : "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\ScreenConnect\\bin\\roslyn\\csc.exe"
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1190"
name = "Exploit Public-Facing Application"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.001"
name = "PowerShell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.003"
name = "Windows Command Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and
  process.parent.name : "ScreenConnect.Service.exe" and
  process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "csc.exe") and
  not process.executable : "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\ScreenConnect\\bin\\roslyn\\csc.exe"

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.executableeq?:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect\bin\roslyn\csc.exeexcludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect\bin\roslyn\csc.exe"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
process.namewildcard
  • cmd.exe corpus 121 (elastic 92, splunk 29)
  • csc.exe corpus 12 (elastic 11, splunk 1)
  • powershell.exe corpus 184 (elastic 140, splunk 44)
  • powershell_ise.exe corpus 52 (splunk 29, elastic 23)
  • pwsh.exe corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
field:"process_name" kind:wildcard
process.parent.namewildcard
  • ScreenConnect.Service.exe corpus 2 (elastic 2)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard value:"ScreenConnect.Service.exe"