Detection rules › Elastic

Process Creation via Microsoft Office Add-Ins

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the creation of Microsoft Office child process as a result of a load Office Add-In. Adversaries may leverage malicious Microsoft Office Add-Ins for initial access and execution.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the creation of Microsoft Office child process as a result of a load Office Add-In. Adversaries may leverage
malicious Microsoft Office Add-Ins for initial access and execution.
"""
id = "b9956c53-30e1-4c13-b75f-addb3a032f83"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Process Creation via Microsoft Office Add-Ins"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://github.com/Octoberfest7/XLL_Phishing",
    "https://labs.f-secure.com/archive/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/",
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/upping-the-ante-detecting-in-memory-threats-with-kernel-call-stacks",
]
version = "1.0.20"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe") and
 _arraysearch(process.parent.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry,
              $entry.symbol_info :
                               ("*!xlAutoOpen*", "*!wlAutoOpen*", "*!wdAutoOpen*", "?:\\Users\\*\\Microsoft\\Word\\STARTUP\\*",
	                            "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\AddIns\\*",
	                            "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\*")) and
 not (process.code_signature.subject_name : "FactSet Research Systems Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and 
 not process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\splwow64.exe" and 
 not process.hash.sha256 : "b52ee82c7e579fd73abc31c368462df9d99c6623be91526ee150706286dc19ee" and
 not (process.parent.name : "Excel.exe" and process.name : "csc.exe" and
      process.parent.args : "https://*.sharepoint.com/sites/*" and process.parent.args : "/cid")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1137"
name = "Office Application Startup"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1137.006"
name = "Add-ins"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.7.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe") and
 _arraysearch(process.parent.thread.Ext.call_stack, $entry,
              $entry.symbol_info :
                               ("*!xlAutoOpen*", "*!wlAutoOpen*", "*!wdAutoOpen*", "?:\\Users\\*\\Microsoft\\Word\\STARTUP\\*",
	                            "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\AddIns\\*",
	                            "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\*")) and
 not (process.code_signature.subject_name : "FactSet Research Systems Inc." and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and 
 not process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\splwow64.exe" and 
 not process.hash.sha256 : "b52ee82c7e579fd73abc31c368462df9d99c6623be91526ee150706286dc19ee" and
 not (process.parent.name : "Excel.exe" and process.name : "csc.exe" and
      process.parent.args : "https://*.sharepoint.com/sites/*" and process.parent.args : "/cid")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
process.parent.namewildcard
  • excel.exe corpus 28 (elastic 27, splunk 1)
  • winword.exe corpus 26 (elastic 26)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard