Detection rules › Elastic

Suspicious Execution from INET Cache

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to the INetCache Folder. Adversaries may deliver malicious content via WININET during initial access.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to the INetCache Folder. Adversaries may deliver malicious
content via WININET during initial access.
"""
id = "7731dc20-5216-49dc-95fe-a29321a345d5"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Execution from INET Cache"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.5"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
  process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "winrar.exe", "7zFM.exe", "Bandizip.exe") and
  (process.command_line : "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\*" or
   process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\*") and
  not (process.code_signature.subject_name :
             ("Google LLC", "Google Inc","Mozilla Corporation", "Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd.",
              "VideoLAN") and
       process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
  not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
       process.args : ("cryptext.dll,CryptExtAddCER", "cryptext.dll,CryptExtOpenCER", "ieframe.dll,OpenUR", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ieframe.dll,OpenURL")) and
  not process.executable :
                 ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
                  "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
                  "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mspaint.exe",
                  "?:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe",
                  "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Codecs\\mpc-hc.exe",
                  "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\*.exe",
                  "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Microsoft VS Code\\Code.exe") and
  not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and not process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1203"
name = "Exploitation for Client Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1105"
name = "Ingress Tool Transfer"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and
  process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "winrar.exe", "7zFM.exe", "Bandizip.exe") and
  (process.command_line : "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\*" or
   process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\*") and
  not (process.code_signature.subject_name :
             ("Google LLC", "Google Inc","Mozilla Corporation", "Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd.",
              "VideoLAN") and
       process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
  not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
       process.args : ("cryptext.dll,CryptExtAddCER", "cryptext.dll,CryptExtOpenCER", "ieframe.dll,OpenUR", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ieframe.dll,OpenURL")) and
  not process.executable :
                 ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
                  "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
                  "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mspaint.exe",
                  "?:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe",
                  "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Codecs\\mpc-hc.exe",
                  "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\*.exe",
                  "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Microsoft VS Code\\Code.exe") and
  not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and not process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.code_signature.subject_namestarts_withMicrosoftexcludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Microsoft"
process.code_signature.trustedeqtrueexcludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true"
process.argseqcryptext.dll,CryptExtAddCER, cryptext.dll,CryptExtOpenCER, ieframe.dll,OpenUR, C:\Windows\System32\ieframe.dll,OpenURLexcludes:process.args
process.nameeqrundll32.exeexcludes:process.name field:"process.name" value:"rundll32.exe"
process.code_signature.subject_nameeqGoogle LLC, Google Inc, Mozilla Corporation, Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd., VideoLANexcludes:process.code_signature.subject_name
process.executablewildcard?:\Program Files\*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\mspaint.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe, C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Codecs\mpc-hc.exe, ?:\Windows\CCM\*.exe, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exeexcludes:process.executable

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
event.actioneq
  • start corpus 391 (elastic 391)
field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start"
process.code_signature.subject_namewildcard
  • Microsoft* corpus 22 (elastic 22)
field:"Signature" kind:wildcard value:"Microsoft*"
process.command_linewildcard
  • *\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\*
field:"CommandLine" kind:wildcard value:"*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\*"
process.executablewildcard
  • ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\* corpus 2 (elastic 2)
field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\*"
process.parent.namewildcard
  • 7zFM.exe corpus 12 (elastic 12)
  • Bandizip.exe corpus 5 (elastic 5)
  • explorer.exe corpus 51 (elastic 50, splunk 1)
  • winrar.exe corpus 15 (elastic 14, splunk 1)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard