Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Execution from INET Cache
Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to the INetCache Folder. Adversaries may deliver malicious content via WININET during initial access.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Execution | |
| Command & Control |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a process with arguments pointing to the INetCache Folder. Adversaries may deliver malicious
content via WININET during initial access.
"""
id = "7731dc20-5216-49dc-95fe-a29321a345d5"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Execution from INET Cache"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.5"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "winrar.exe", "7zFM.exe", "Bandizip.exe") and
(process.command_line : "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\*" or
process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\*") and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name :
("Google LLC", "Google Inc","Mozilla Corporation", "Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd.",
"VideoLAN") and
process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
process.args : ("cryptext.dll,CryptExtAddCER", "cryptext.dll,CryptExtOpenCER", "ieframe.dll,OpenUR", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ieframe.dll,OpenURL")) and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\mspaint.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Codecs\\mpc-hc.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\CCM\\*.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Microsoft VS Code\\Code.exe") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and not process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1203"
name = "Exploitation for Client Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1105"
name = "Ingress Tool Transfer"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "winrar.exe", "7zFM.exe", "Bandizip.exe") and
(process.command_line : "*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\*" or
process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\INetCache\\IE\\*") and
not (process.code_signature.subject_name :
("Google LLC", "Google Inc","Mozilla Corporation", "Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd.",
"VideoLAN") and
process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
process.args : ("cryptext.dll,CryptExtAddCER", "cryptext.dll,CryptExtOpenCER", "ieframe.dll,OpenUR", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ieframe.dll,OpenURL")) and
not process.executable :
("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\mspaint.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Codecs\\mpc-hc.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\CCM\\*.exe",
"?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Microsoft VS Code\\Code.exe") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and not process.code_signature.subject_name : "Microsoft*")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.code_signature.subject_name | starts_with | Microsoft | excludes:process.code_signature.subject_name field:"process.code_signature.subject_name" value:"Microsoft" |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
process.args | eq | cryptext.dll,CryptExtAddCER, cryptext.dll,CryptExtOpenCER, ieframe.dll,OpenUR, C:\Windows\System32\ieframe.dll,OpenURL | excludes:process.args |
process.name | eq | rundll32.exe | excludes:process.name field:"process.name" value:"rundll32.exe" |
process.code_signature.subject_name | eq | Google LLC, Google Inc, Mozilla Corporation, Zhuhai Kingsoft Office Software Co., Ltd., VideoLAN | excludes:process.code_signature.subject_name |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files\*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\mspaint.exe, ?:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe, C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Codecs\mpc-hc.exe, ?:\Windows\CCM\*.exe, ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe | excludes:process.executable |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.code_signature.subject_name | wildcard |
| field:"Signature" kind:wildcard value:"Microsoft*" |
process.command_line | wildcard |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:wildcard value:"*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\*" |
process.executable | wildcard |
| field:"Image" kind:wildcard value:"?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\*" |
process.parent.name | wildcard |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:wildcard |