Detection rules › Elastic
Suspicious Execution via a Mounted Image File
Identifies the execution of a process from a mounted image file. Attacker may abuse IMG files to deliver malicious programs.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Rule body
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a process from a mounted image file. Attacker may abuse IMG files to deliver malicious
programs.
"""
id = "9401d27c-200a-4d72-ad36-f7051c4b3dcb"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Execution via a Mounted Image File"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.29"
query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.executable : "\\Device\\CdRom0\\*" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"\\Device\\CdRom0\\*") and
not process.code_signature.trusted == true and
not (process.parent.name : "setup.exe" and process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*.tmp\\setup.tmp") and
not process.executable : "?:\\WINDOWS\\regtlib.exe" and
not process.hash.sha256 :
("632c8f0313f35fc45daa4471f9c8c32075156bc696fb20cd19a33a8c760b1297",
"5b82b27da9bbaae1abc32095942c60017b275e002cbb2c0cb44580131f4789b4",
"dafb5d89135fa565080c9c6beafbdeb7611089e946a520001a7ef02facb002d3",
"18d1bae077da62bb5cf5bfa6a6c5c38ac9ade57f098ea2b357fab477e85f1c25",
"ab9e0291a763efc32e84e7117f9a0fbc99b681c96df0bb27a66433a726667e5c")
'''
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: process
process where event.action == "start" and
process.parent.executable : "\\Device\\CdRom0\\*" and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"\\Device\\CdRom0\\*") and
not process.code_signature.trusted == true and
not (process.parent.name : "setup.exe" and process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*.tmp\\setup.tmp") and
not process.executable : "?:\\WINDOWS\\regtlib.exe" and
not process.hash.sha256 :
("632c8f0313f35fc45daa4471f9c8c32075156bc696fb20cd19a33a8c760b1297",
"5b82b27da9bbaae1abc32095942c60017b275e002cbb2c0cb44580131f4789b4",
"dafb5d89135fa565080c9c6beafbdeb7611089e946a520001a7ef02facb002d3",
"18d1bae077da62bb5cf5bfa6a6c5c38ac9ade57f098ea2b357fab477e85f1c25",
"ab9e0291a763efc32e84e7117f9a0fbc99b681c96df0bb27a66433a726667e5c")
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\*.tmp\setup.tmp | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\*.tmp\setup.tmp" |
process.parent.name | eq | setup.exe | excludes:process.parent.name field:"process.parent.name" value:"setup.exe" |
process.code_signature.trusted | eq | true | excludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true" |
process.executable | eq | ?:\WINDOWS\regtlib.exe | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\WINDOWS\regtlib.exe" |
process.executable | wildcard | ?:\Program Files\*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe, \Device\CdRom0\* | excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"\Device\CdRom0\*" |
process.hash.sha256 | eq | 632c8f0313f35fc45daa4471f9c8c32075156bc696fb20cd19a33a8c760b1297, 5b82b27da9bbaae1abc32095942c60017b275e002cbb2c0cb44580131f4789b4, dafb5d89135fa565080c9c6beafbdeb7611089e946a520001a7ef02facb002d3, 18d1bae077da62bb5cf5bfa6a6c5c38ac9ade57f098ea2b357fab477e85f1c25, ab9e0291a763efc32e84e7117f9a0fbc99b681c96df0bb27a66433a726667e5c | excludes:process.hash.sha256 |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
event.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq value:"start" |
process.parent.executable | wildcard |
| field:"ParentImage" kind:wildcard value:"\Device\CdRom0\*" |