Detection rules › Elastic

Suspicious Execution via a Mounted Image File

Source
github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts

Identifies the execution of a process from a mounted image file. Attacker may abuse IMG files to deliver malicious programs.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

Rule body

[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a process from a mounted image file. Attacker may abuse IMG files to deliver malicious
programs.
"""
id = "9401d27c-200a-4d72-ad36-f7051c4b3dcb"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Execution via a Mounted Image File"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.29"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.executable : "\\Device\\CdRom0\\*" and
 not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
                           "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
                           "\\Device\\CdRom0\\*") and
 not process.code_signature.trusted == true and
 not (process.parent.name : "setup.exe" and process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*.tmp\\setup.tmp") and 
 not process.executable : "?:\\WINDOWS\\regtlib.exe" and 
 not process.hash.sha256 :
            ("632c8f0313f35fc45daa4471f9c8c32075156bc696fb20cd19a33a8c760b1297",
             "5b82b27da9bbaae1abc32095942c60017b275e002cbb2c0cb44580131f4789b4",
             "dafb5d89135fa565080c9c6beafbdeb7611089e946a520001a7ef02facb002d3",
             "18d1bae077da62bb5cf5bfa6a6c5c38ac9ade57f098ea2b357fab477e85f1c25",
             "ab9e0291a763efc32e84e7117f9a0fbc99b681c96df0bb27a66433a726667e5c")
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: process

process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.executable : "\\Device\\CdRom0\\*" and
 not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
                           "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
                           "\\Device\\CdRom0\\*") and
 not process.code_signature.trusted == true and
 not (process.parent.name : "setup.exe" and process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*.tmp\\setup.tmp") and 
 not process.executable : "?:\\WINDOWS\\regtlib.exe" and 
 not process.hash.sha256 :
            ("632c8f0313f35fc45daa4471f9c8c32075156bc696fb20cd19a33a8c760b1297",
             "5b82b27da9bbaae1abc32095942c60017b275e002cbb2c0cb44580131f4789b4",
             "dafb5d89135fa565080c9c6beafbdeb7611089e946a520001a7ef02facb002d3",
             "18d1bae077da62bb5cf5bfa6a6c5c38ac9ade57f098ea2b357fab477e85f1c25",
             "ab9e0291a763efc32e84e7117f9a0fbc99b681c96df0bb27a66433a726667e5c")

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process.executablewildcard?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\*.tmp\setup.tmpexcludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\*.tmp\setup.tmp"
process.parent.nameeqsetup.exeexcludes:process.parent.name field:"process.parent.name" value:"setup.exe"
process.code_signature.trustedeqtrueexcludes:process.code_signature.trusted field:"process.code_signature.trusted" value:"true"
process.executableeq?:\WINDOWS\regtlib.exeexcludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\WINDOWS\regtlib.exe"
process.executablewildcard?:\Program Files\*.exe, ?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe, \Device\CdRom0\*excludes:process.executable field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files\*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"?:\Program Files (x86)\*.exe" field:"process.executable" value:"\Device\CdRom0\*"
process.hash.sha256eq632c8f0313f35fc45daa4471f9c8c32075156bc696fb20cd19a33a8c760b1297, 5b82b27da9bbaae1abc32095942c60017b275e002cbb2c0cb44580131f4789b4, dafb5d89135fa565080c9c6beafbdeb7611089e946a520001a7ef02facb002d3, 18d1bae077da62bb5cf5bfa6a6c5c38ac9ade57f098ea2b357fab477e85f1c25, ab9e0291a763efc32e84e7117f9a0fbc99b681c96df0bb27a66433a726667e5cexcludes:process.hash.sha256

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.